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[1293] 
The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on 
the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging 
Policy 
Court E. Golumbic and Albert D. Lichy 
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of the Department of Justice (“Justice 
Department” or “DOJ”) to bring criminal charges against any financial institutions 
prompted critics to question whether the DOJ maintained a policy that certain 
corporations are “too big to jail.” The criticism piqued after the DOJ announced that it 
had entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) with HSBC to resolve a 
massive money laundering and government sanctions investigation.  
This wave of criticism is the backdrop for what the Authors call the “too big to jail” 
effect—two related developments, each of which has the potential to impact the future of 
DPAs in the corporate crime context. The first is a willingness on the part of at least one 
federal district court to inject a level of judicial intervention into the process of structuring 
DPAs. In approving the HSBC, Judge John Gleeson issued a groundbreaking opinion 
articulating, for the first time, a standard for district court review of the terms of a DPA. 
The second is an emerging willingness on the part of the DOJ to pursue criminal charges 
over DPAs in high-profile cases involving financial institutions. In a strong departure from 
past practice, the DOJ recently secured guilty pleas from the foreign subsidiaries of UBS 
and RBS, SAC Capital Advisors and three related entities, and the parent of Credit Suisse.  
This Article examines the impact of the “too big to jail” effect on the Justice Department’s 
corporate charging practices. The Authors argue that DPAs should not be abandoned. 
Instead, Congress should amend the Speedy Trial Act to require substantive, judicial 
review of the terms of DPAs. To this end, the Authors propose a standard of review that 
is designed to maximize the benefits of DPAs, while minimizing the concerns that have 
historically accompanied their use.  
* Court E. Golumbic is a Managing Director and the global Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-
Bribery, and Government Sanctions Compliance Officer at a major global financial institution. He is 
also a Lecturer-in-Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and a former Assistant United 
States Attorney with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York. 
** Albert D. Lichy graduated from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 2011 and is one of 
Court Golumbic’s former students. He will soon begin a clerkship in the chambers of the Hon. Thomas L. 
Ambro of the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.  
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Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing economic downturn 
have prompted intense scrutiny of the United States Department of 
Justice’s (“Justice Department” or “DOJ”) charging practices with 
respect to corporate defendants.1 Specifically, the Justice Department’s 
failure to bring criminal charges against any financial institutions for 
their perceived role in causing the crisis prompted members of Congress, 
the press, and the public to question whether the agency has maintained 
a de facto policy that certain corporations are “too big jail” given their 
size and economic significance.2 
Criticism of the Justice Department’s approach piqued after its 
December 12, 2012 announcement that it had entered into a deferred 
prosecution agreement (“DPA”)3 with HSBC in the face of overwhelming 
evidence—and HSBC’s own admission—that it enabled Mexican and 
Colombian narcotics cartels to launder more than $800 million through 
one if its subsidiaries, and that the bank facilitated over $660 million in 
transactions involving Cuba, Iran, and other jurisdictions subject to U.S. 
economic sanctions.4 Statements by a senior DOJ official suggesting that 
the DOJ’s goal in negotiating the HSBC DPA was “not to bring HSBC 
down, . . . not to cause a systemic effect on the economy, . . . [and] not for 
people to lose thousands of jobs,”5 were met with indignation and fueled 
speculation that the fear of potential collateral consequences is the 
deciding factor dictating federal prosecutors’ corporate charging 
decisions.6 
The Justice Department’s extension of a DPA to HSBC was not a 
novel move; rather, it reflects more than a decade of practice that emerged 
in response to another, earlier wave of criticism of Justice Department 
charging policy—the 2003 indictment of Arthur Andersen, then a 
prominent U.S. accounting firm, for its role in obstructing an investigation 
1. See infra notes 143–195 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra notes 143–195 and accompanying text. 
3. A deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) is an agreement between a prosecutor and a
defendant whereby the defendant agrees to waive indictment and consents to the filing of criminal 
charges in exchange for certain undertakings on the defendant’s part. See Scott A. Resnik & Keir N. 
Dougall, The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 18, 2006, at 1; see also infra 
notes 36–38 and accompanying text. If these undertakings are not violated for a specified period of 
time, the criminal charges are ultimately dismissed. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
4. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A.
Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ’s HSBC Press Release], available at 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html. 
5. James O’Toole, HSBC: Too Big to Jail?, CNNMoney (Dec. 12, 2012, 1:08 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/12/12/news/companies/hsbc-money-laundering. 
6. See infra notes 188– 195, 202–203 and accompanying text. 
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into widespread accounting fraud at Enron.7 The indictment and ultimate 
criminal conviction of Andersen triggered the firm’s bankruptcy, and led 
28,000 individuals to lose their jobs.8 Intense scrutiny regarding potential 
prosecutorial overreaching in the wake of Andersen’s demise, especially 
following the Supreme Court’s reversal of the firm’s conviction, caused 
the DOJ to abandon its traditional approach of either indicting or 
declining to indict corporate defendants in favor of negotiating DPAs and 
non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”).9 The objective underlying this 
shift was simple: to avoid a repeat of the “Arthur Andersen effect.”10 
Today, more than ten years after Andersen, the Justice Department’s 
corporate charging policies have again become the subject of scrutiny.11 
This time, however, the focus of the criticism is not the potential for the 
DOJ to be overzealous in its approach to corporate criminality. Instead the 
focus is the possibility that by maintaining a “too big to jail” policy, the 
DOJ is not being zealous enough.12 The DOJ has vehemently denied that 
it has such a policy, including in public statements by Attorney General 
Eric Holder himself.13  
7. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen
Prosecution, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 107, 109–10 (2006) (describing the Arthur Andersen prosecution as 
“misguided”); John C. Danforth, When Enforcement Becomes Harassment, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2003, at 
A31 (criticizing the Justice Department for hanging Arthur Andersen for “the actions of a few”). 
8. See Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 1, 14–15 (2006) (“With the criminal 
indictment, Anderson [sic] could no longer audit public companies. Twenty-eight thousand people lost 
their jobs and Arthur Andersen became a shell of its former self.”); see also infra notes 78–93 and 
accompanying text.  
9. See generally Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. (Jan. 20, 2003) 
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv_dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf; Erik Paulsen, 
Note, Imposing limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreement, 82 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1434, 1436 (2007) (explaining that the use of DPAs and non-prosecution agreements “exploded 
after the demise of the corporate accounting giant Arthur Andersen”); see also infra notes 94–125 and 
accompanying text. NPAs are similar to DPAs in that they are privately negotiated agreements 
between the DOJ and a defendant whereby the defendant consents to certain undertakings, which, if 
adhered to for a specified time, will result in the resolution of a criminal matter. See generally David 
Debold & Kyle C. Barry, Consistency in Non-Prosecution and Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A 
Lesson From the World of Federal Sentencing, 20 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 331 (2008) (highlighting the 
differences between DPAs and NPAs). The primary difference between a DPA and an NPA is that an 
NPA typically does not entail the filing of any criminal charges. Id. at 331.  
10. We borrow the phrase “Arthur Andersen effect” from Professor Peter J. Henning. See Peter 
J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 312, 314 (2007). 
Professor Henning used the term to refer to “the collateral damage from a conviction in which 
innocent employees unconnected to the wrongdoing lose their jobs and investments in the firm.” Id. 
11. See infra notes 188– 195, 202–203 and accompanying text. 
12.  See, e.g., Shahien Nasiripour & Tom Braithwaite, Finance: Out to Break the Banks, Fin.
Times, May 1, 2013, at 11 (describing popular criticism of the sentiment that banks are too big to fail 
and thus too big to jail); see also infra notes 188–195, 202–203 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra note 196–201, 286–289 and accompanying text. 
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This new strand of criticism coincided with two related developments 
within the executive and judicial branches of the government, each of 
which has the potential to substantially impact the Justice Department’s 
future corporate charging practices. We term this coincidence the “too big 
to jail” effect. The first development is an inclination on the part of at 
least one federal district judge to inject a level of substantive oversight 
into the process of approving DPAs.14 In reviewing the HSBC DPA, 
Judge John Gleeson issued a groundbreaking opinion articulating a 
standard for judicial review of DPAs and assessing the HSBC DPA in 
light of that standard.15 
The second development is an emerging willingness on the part of 
the Justice Department to pursue criminal charges over DPAs in high-
profile cases involving financial institutions.16 Only eight days after 
entering into the HSBC DPA, the DOJ secured guilty pleas from the 
Japanese subsidiaries of the United Bank of Switzerland (“UBS”) and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) for their roles in a scheme to 
manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rates (“LIBOR”).17 A few 
months later, federal prosecutors indicted S.A.C. Capital Advisors and 
three related entities (collectively, “SAC Capital”), one of the nation’s 
most prominent hedge fund managers, on insider trading charges.18 SAC 
Capital ultimately pleaded guilty to the charges, agreeing to pay 
$1.8 billion and terminate its investment advisory business.19 And most 
recently, in the largest departure from its post-Andersen corporate 
charging policies, the DOJ announced that it had secured a guilty plea 
from Credit Suisse Group AG, the Swiss banking giant, for conspiring to 
aid tax evasion.20 
This Article examines the impact of these recent developments on 
the Justice Department’s historical reliance on deferred prosecutions. 
Part I traces the evolution of the DPA from its origins as a mechanism 
for alternate resolution of juvenile crime and other minor cases, through 
14. See infra notes 204–246 and accompanying text. 
15. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *2–4 
(E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013). 
16. See infra notes 249–294 and accompanying text. 
17. Id. 
18. See Peter Lattman & Ben Protess, Fund Indicted; Called Magnet for Cheating, N.Y. Times,
July 26, 2013, at A1 (discussing charges filed against S.A.C. Capital). 
19. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea
Agreement With SAC Capital Mgmt. Cos. (Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ’s SAC Capital Press 
Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/November13/SACPleaPR.php. 
20. Under the plea agreement, Credit Suisse would plead guilty to a single charge of conspiring to 
aid tax evasion. The fine imposed on Credit Suisse will amount to $2.6 billion. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing 
False Returns (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Credit Suisse Press Release], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-531.html; see also infra notes 290–294 and 
accompanying text.  
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its early application to corporate criminal cases, to the widespread 
adoption of the DPA as prosecutors’ tool of choice in the years following 
Andersen’s collapse.21 
Part II reviews the advantages and disadvantages of modern DPAs.22 
The Part shows how deferrals are an effective means of achieving the 
benefits of criminal prosecution while avoiding undesirable collateral 
consequences.23 Part II also notes, however, that corporate defendants’ 
incentive to avoid criminal charges at all cost, coupled with the absence of 
any outside check on prosecutors’ discretion to structure the conditions of 
deferral, have resulted in agreements that have been criticized as 
onerous.24 
Part III reviews the post-financial crisis and the emergence of the 
“too big to jail” construct. It tracks the emerging concern that the Justice 
Department has accorded undue weight to collateral consequences in 
forming its charging decisions, emanating from the DOJ’s failure to bring 
any crisis-related prosecutions of financial institutions and the HSBC 
DPA.25 
Part IV examines the “too big to jail” effect by tracing recent events 
that transpired in ‘close temporal proximity to the surge in criticism of 
DOJ charging practices. The Part first reviews Judge Gleeson’s opinion in 
the HSBC case.26 While the standard of review Gleeson’s opinion 
establishes is of questionable value as a check on prosecutorial discretion, 
it is nevertheless the first time that a court has been willing to assume a 
substantive role in approving DPAs.27 The Part questions whether Judge 
Gleeson’s opinion opens the door to more affirmative judicial review in 
the future. 
Next, Part IV outlines the LIBOR, SAC Capital, and Credit Suisse 
prosecutions.28 The significance of these cases cannot be understated, as 
it had been more than twenty years since the Justice Department filed 
criminal charges against a major financial institution.29 The Part explores 
whether these cases signal a shift away from the DOJ’s decade-long 
21. See infra Parts I.A–B. 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part II.B. 
24. See infra Part II.A. 
25. See infra Parts III.A, B.2. 
26. See infra Part IV.A. 
27. See, e.g., John F. Savarese et al., New Standards for Judicial Approval of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, 50 Bank & Corp. Governance L. Rep. 907, 907 (2013) (describing the novelty of Judge 
Gleeson’s judicial review). 
28. See infra Part IV. 
29. See Peter J. Henning, UBS Settlement Minimizes Impact of Guilty Plea, N.Y. Times DealBook 
(Dec. 20, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ubs-settlement-minimizes-impact-of-
guilty-plea (“[T]he guilty plea by the UBS subsidiary is the first time an arm of [a] major financial 
institution has been convicted of a crime since Drexel Burnham was more than 20 years ago.”). 
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resort to DPAs as the preferred means to address corporate crime, and 
thus whether more aggressive tactics can be expected going forward.30 
The Article concludes in Part V by arguing that DPAs should not be 
abandoned as the default approach in corporate criminal cases.31 Instead, 
Congress should follow Judge Gleeson’s lead and amend the Speedy 
Trial Act to expressly require substantive judicial review of the terms of 
DPAs.32 Doing so would inject a measure of independence to guard 
against both prosecutorial leniency and excess. To this end, a standard for 
judicial review is proposed that is designed to maximize the benefits of 
deferred prosecutions while minimizing the concerns that have historically 
accompanied their use.33 
I.  The DPA: Federal Prosecutors’ Weapon of Choice to Combat 
Corporate Crime 
A. The Anatomy of a DPA 
The mechanics of a deferred prosecution at the federal level are 
simple: once a prosecutor recommends a case for diversion, the pretrial 
services agency or the probation office must agree to accept the defendant 
into the diversion program.34 In exchange for the prosecutor’s stipulation 
to “defer” criminal charges, the defendant agrees to waive indictment and 
be charged criminally, and to fulfill certain requirements over a specified 
period of time.35 If the defendant discharges her obligations, the charges 
against her are dismissed and she is treated as if the government declined 
to prosecute at the outset.36 She therefore avoids “the potentially lifelong 
collateral consequences of a felony conviction, such as exclusion from 
jury service, government benefits, public housing, educational grants, and 
30. See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
31. See infra Part V.A. 
32. See infra Part V.B. 
33. See infra Part V.B. 
34. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual § 712, in U.S. Attorneys’ Manual
(1997) (outlining pre-trial diversion procedures); Steven R. Peikin, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: 
Standard for Corporate Probes, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31, 2005, available at 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ id=900005422568/Deferred-Prosecution-Agreements:-Standard-
for-Corporate-Probes?slreturn=20140117032629. 
35. See Peikin, supra note 34. The defendant also agrees to waive her speedy trial rights and the
tolling of any limitations period. See id. 
36. Entering into a DPA does not increase a defendant’s criminal history score under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(f) (1997) (providing 
that “[d]iversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g., deferred prosecution) is not 
counted” as a sentence under U.S. Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4A1.1(c)). The same is not true 
of guilty pleas, which “result[] in a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the 
offender had been convicted in a trial.” Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution 
Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1863, 
1869 (2005). Thus, all things considered, a defendant would much prefer diversion to pleading guilty. 
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voting.”37 If the defendant fails to abide by the terms of the deferred 
prosecution, however, she faces the specter of criminal prosecution just 
the same as if the government had never granted a deferral.38 
The role of the trial court in the deferred prosecution context is 
quite different than its role when presented with a guilty plea. When a 
defendant enters into a plea bargain, the trial court assumes a substantive 
gatekeeper role under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.39 The court must examine guilty pleas for “voluntariness, 
factual basis, fairness, abuse of discretion, or infringement on the judge’s 
sentencing power.”40 If the plea bargain does not satisfy the requirements 
of Rule 11, the court cannot accept the defendant’s admission of guilt.41 It 
is also the case that the court need not accept a plea bargain if it believes 
“that [the] bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public 
interest.”42 
The United States Code contemplates a much narrower role for the 
district court in the deferred prosecution context. While the Speedy Trial 
Act provides that a DPA must be presented to the district court for its 
approval, the Act is silent as to how the court should exercise its 
discretion.43 It says only that “with the approval of the court,” the 
government may defer prosecution pursuant to a written agreement.44 
Predictably, therefore, district courts routinely rubber stamp DPAs the 
37. Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1866–67. 
38. Some courts have held that prosecutors cannot unilaterally determine that a defendant
breached her obligations under a DPA. Rather, there must be a judicial determination to that effect. 
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n the context of non-
prosecution agreements the government is prevented by due process considerations from unilaterally 
determining that a defendant is in breach and nullifying the agreement.”); United States v. Meyer, 
157 F.3d 1067, 1077 (7th Cir. 1998) (“In accordance with due process, [the defendant] was entitled to a 
judicial determination that he had breached the agreement before being subjected to the risk of 
conviction.”). Nevertheless, it has become standard fare for prosecutors to include within DPAs a 
stipulation to the effect that it is solely within the prosecutor’s discretion to determine whether the 
DPA has been breached. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853, 
919 (2007) (observing that most DPAs permit a unilateral finding of breach). 
39. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)–(3); see also Garrett, supra note 38, at 906 (“Federal courts are
more involved in reviewing plea bargains than charging decisions.”). 
40. Garrett, supra note 38, at 906. 
41. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)–(3). 
42. United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1462 (10th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide that in the 
case of charge bargains, “the court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons 
stated on the record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual 
offense behavior and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of 
sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6B1.2(a) (2013). 
43. The Speedy Trial Act provides district judges with the power to approve DPAs, but does not
otherwise specify judicial involvement in the DPA process. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) (2012). 
44. Id. 
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same day they are presented for approval.45 Indeed, in the corporate 
criminal prosecution context, no court has rejected, much less modified, 
a DPA.46 
B. The Evolution of DPAs as the Tool of Choice to Combat 
Corporate Crime 
1. The E.F. Hutton, Drexel, and Salomon Cases
Historically, prosecutors viewed their charging decision as a stark 
choice between indicting or declining to file charges.47 The concept of 
deferring prosecution rose to prominence in the 1960s to provide a third 
option between these two extremes.48 Deferred prosecutions were initially 
utilized only in relatively minor cases against individual offenders in the 
state system, such as cases involving juveniles and small-time narcotics 
offenders, “where prosecution would be counterproductive, ineffective or 
unwarranted.”49 
The federal prosecutions of E.F. Hutton (“Hutton”) in 1985 and 
Drexel Burnham Lambert (“Drexel”) in 1989 suggested that a middle 
option would be desirable in the corporate context as well. After Hutton 
pleaded guilty to multiple counts of mail and wire fraud, the company 
45. See Douglas Gillison, HSBC Judge, Reluctant to Bless Settlement, Explores Court’s Role, Main 
Justice (Mar. 29, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2013/03/29/hsbc-judge-reluctant-to-
bless-settlement-explores-courts-role (providing a chart that illustrates that in the last four years, 
Judge Gleeson is the only district judge to have spent more than two days reviewing the terms of a 
DPA involving a large bank). 
46. See Garrett, supra note 38, at 893 (noting that while “[c]ourts have statutory authority to 
approve deferral of a prosecution, . . . no court has rejected an agreement”—at least in the case of 
corporate crime); Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the 
Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 Ky. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements often occur without judicial oversight or participation . . . . Even in the rare case that has 
court participation, it is usually a mere formality of the document being filed in the court.”); Dieter 
Juedes, Taming the FCPA Overreach Through an Adequate Procedures Defense, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus. 
L. Rev. 37, 49 (2013) (“[A]lthough a DPA is filed with a court and could be subject to judicial scrutiny, 
the agreements are regularly ‘rubber-stamped’ by judges without modification.”). 
47. In the corporate criminal liability context, most prosecutors “believed their expertise lay in
determining retrospective questions of criminal liability,” rather than designing prospective corporate 
governance reforms as part of a deferred prosecution. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New 
Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 159, 164 (2008). 
48. See Developments in the Law—Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1863, 1902–03
(1998) (indicating that the formal practice of deferring prosecution “was developed first in the juvenile 
courts, but flourished outside the juvenile context after the Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in 
Robinson v. California,” which held that “a state law which imprisons a person . . . [for a ‘status 
offense’ such as drug addiction] inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment” (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962))). 
49. State v. Leonardis, 363 A.2d 321, 323 (N.J. 1976); see Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1866–71 
(tracing the development of deferred prosecutions). 
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was drastically weakened and forced to merge with a competitor.50 A 
year after Drexel’s guilty plea to various securities fraud and other 
charges, the firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection when it could 
not fund more than $100 million in loans.51 These cases contributed to the 
general perception that a criminal conviction was not the preferred means 
of rehabilitating a corporation and achieving maximum deterrence.52 
The opportunity to leverage a third option in the corporate context 
first arose in 1992 in connection with the DOJ’s investigation of Salomon 
Brothers (“Salomon”) for submitting false and unauthorized bids to 
purchase U.S. Treasury notes in violation of the federal False Claims 
Act53 and the Sherman Act.54 Rather than file charges against Salomon, 
federal prosecutors offered Salomon the opportunity to enter into an 
NPA.55 In exchange for the government’s promise not to file charges, 
Salomon agreed to: (1) pay $290 million in fines, forfeiture, and victim 
compensation; (2) continue cooperating with investigators; and 
(3) implement compliance procedures to prevent similar wrongdoing.56 
To justify this novel move, then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York, Otto Obermaier, whose office conducted the investigation, 
touted Salomon’s “unprecedented” cooperation, its replacement of key 
figures in senior management positions, the civil penalties the Securities 
50. E.F. Hutton pleaded guilty to two thousand counts of mail and wire fraud in connection with
its role perpetrating a massive check-kiting scheme, which reportedly involved “obtain[ing] the 
interest-free use of millions of dollars by intentionally writing checks in excess of the funds it had on 
deposit in various banks.” E.F. Hutton Pleads Guilty to Fraud, Fined $2 Million: Used Checks to Avoid 
Interest, L.A. Times, May 2, 1985, at 1. The guilty plea required E.F. Hutton to pay $2 million in fines and 
$750,000 in costs. Id. At the time, E.F. Hutton was one of “Wall Street’s most formidable giants.” 
R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution 
for an Age of Corporate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1113, 1147 (2003). 
51. In 1989, Drexel Burnham Lambert, at the time a Wall Street powerhouse and the pioneer of
the high-yield junk bonds, pleaded guilty to six counts of mail, wire, and securities fraud in connection 
with allegations that it engaged in insider trading. See Stephen Labaton, Drexel Concedes Guilt on 
Trading; to Pay $650 Million, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1988, at A1. The plea agreement required Drexel to 
pay $650 million. Id. By pleading guilty, Drexel reportedly escaped racketeering and obstruction of 
justice charges. See id. 
52. See Davis Polk’s Scott Muller on the Rise of Corporate Deferred Prosecutions, 24 Corp. Crime
Rep. 37, Sept. 27, 2010, available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/ 
scottmuller092710_000.htm (“EF Hutton was prosecuted with over 2,000 counts of mail fraud and had 
gone down the tubes. So, there was a real concern about prosecuting financial institutions.”). 
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012). 
55. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million 
Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case (May 20, 1992) [hereinafter DOJ Salomon 
Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211182.htm. 
56. See id. Some commentators have opined that if Salomon Brothers had been tried and
convicted it “would have almost certainly resulted in the financial ruin of Salomon, because of the 
highly regulated environment in which it operates as well as its dependence on consumer trust.” 
F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred Prosecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for 
Corporate Defendants, 23 J. Corp. L. 121, 124 (1997). 
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) imposed, and the collateral 
consequences an indictment would have triggered.57 
2. Prosecutors’ First Use of a DPA in the Corporate Crime Context
The Salomon NPA is credited with laying the groundwork for the 
first use of a DPA in the corporate crime context.58 This occurred two 
years later, as federal prosecutors confronted evidence that Prudential 
Securities (“Prudential”) had committed securities fraud in connection 
with sale of partnership interests in one of Prudential’s mutual funds.59 
As in the Salomon case, the DOJ stopped short of prosecuting 
Prudential. Instead, then-United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York, Mary Jo White, signed off on the deferred 
prosecution of Prudential for a period of three years, provided that the 
company: (1) paid $330 million; (2) cooperated with the government’s 
investigation; and (3) appointed an independent director to Prudential’s 
board to “serve as an independent ‘ombudsman’ whom [Prudential] 
employees can call anonymously with complaints about ethics and 
compliance.”60 In announcing the settlement, White noted that “[t]he 
public interest is well served by this agreement”61 because “[u]pon 
conviction, a corporation cannot be sentenced to jail but only to pay 
restitution, fines and adopt measures aimed at enhancing internal 
controls to prevent and detect future wrongdoing.”62 In White’s view, the 
Prudential DPA “impose[d] such sanctions.”63 
57. DOJ Salomon Press Release, supra note 55. 
58. See Davis Polk’s Scott Muller on the Rise of Corporate Deferred Prosecutions, supra note 52 
(noting that the Prudential Securities DPA was the “first ever” DPA in the corporate context); see 
also Spivack & Raman, supra note 47, at 163–64 (“Though the Salomon case did not involve a formal 
non-prosecution agreement, it provided a clear message to companies that full cooperation, and the 
sincere willingness to clean house, could lead to favorable results.”). 
59. See generally Deferred Prosecution, Prudential Securities Inc. (S.D.N.Y 1994) (Mag. No. 94), 
available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
prudential.pdf. 
60. See id. at *5–6. Notably, Mary Jo White, the pioneer of the corporate DPA, has been one of the 
strongest critics of the manner in which DPAs have been deployed. See An Informed and Forceful 
Critique of NPAs and DPAs By . . . Guess Who?, FCPA Professor (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/an-informed-and-forceful-critique-of-npas-and-dpas-by-guess-who 
(providing numerous instances in which Mary Jo White criticized the Justice Department’s use of DPAs). 
61. See Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes in Energy Deals, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 
1994, at A1. 
62. Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, to Scott W. Muller and Carey R. Dunne,
Attorneys for Prudential Sec. Inc. (Oct. 27, 1994) (on file with Authors).  
63. Id. 
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3. The Sparing Use of DPAs in the 1990s
The Salomon and Prudential cases are credited with providing the 
framework for the modern DPA.64 Yet DPAs did not become a mainstay 
of corporate criminal prosecutions until about a decade later. The 
prevailing view in the late 1990s and early 2000s was that it took a “very 
special situation” for prosecutors to defer the prosecution of an 
organizational defendant.65 The mindset was that the prosecutor’s job 
was simply to “charge or not.”66 
The consensus among commentators is that the “indict or walk 
away” dichotomy prevailed because the Justice Department provided no 
guidance to prosecutors regarding when or how to utilize DPAs.67 The 
then-existing version of the United States Attorneys’ Manual made no 
mention of corporate DPAs.68 Deferrals were discussed only in 
conjunction with individual prosecutions.69 In light of this deficiency, and 
64. See, e.g., Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 Brook. J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 45, 62 (2006) (noting that the “Salomon Brothers and Prudential Securities dispositions 
formed the model for scores of subsequent agreements”); Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1873 (citing 
the Salomon Brothers and Prudential Securities agreements as having “laid the groundwork for the 
more widespread and varied use of the mechanism in the modern era”). 
65. Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, New York, 
19 Corp. Crime Rep. 48, Dec. 12, 2005 [hereinafter White Interview], available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/maryjowhiteinterview010806.htm. Years after signing off on 
the Prudential Securities DPA, Mary Jo White observed that “[i]t was certainly not something [she] 
thought [she] was likely to do again.” Id. 
66. Id. 
67. See Spivack & Raman, supra note 47, at 164 (“The gray, uncertain area of deferrals seemed to 
invite prosecutors to insinuate themselves into prospective corporate governance issues. This was 
unappealing, especially considering the absence of formal guidance from DOJ regarding 
organizational prosecutions.”); see also Warin & Schwartz, supra note 56, at 130 (noting that when 
federal prosecutors in the 1990s were “confronted with an organizational defendant for whom pre-trial 
diversion might seem appropriate,” the decision whether to employ a DPA was left entirely to 
prosecutors’ discretion, “with few if any applicable standards upon which to rely”). 
68. As a number of commentators have observed, pre-trial diversion was (and still is) “drafted with a 
view towards pre-trial diversion of individuals, not businesses.” See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 
11; see also Warin & Schwartz, supra note 56, at 130 (“The specific standards for implementation are 
designed for individual defendants (primarily first offenders charged with less serious and non-violent 
crimes) and are inapplicable to corporate and other organizational defendants.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The current version of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual provides that a prosecutor “may divert 
any individual against whom a prosecutable case exists and who is not”: 
1. Accused of an offense which, under existing Department guidelines, should be diverted
to the State for prosecution; 
2. A person with two or more prior felony convictions; 
3. A public official or former public official accused of an offense arising out of an alleged
violation of a public trust; or 
4. Accused of an offense related to national security or foreign affairs. 
Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-22.100 (2011) (emphasis added), with U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 712 (1997) (outlining pre-trial diversion procedures). 
69. See U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 712. 
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in the absence of any further instruction, prosecutors viewed the 
corporate charging decision as binary.70 
This remained the case even after then-Deputy Attorney General 
Eric Holder issued the “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” colloquially 
referred to as the “Holder Memo,” in 1999.71 The Holder Memo, which 
provided corporate charging guidance to prosecutors, marked the first 
time the Justice Department “officially recognized what had become 
obvious to federal prosecutors and judges: corporate charging and 
sentencing decisions involve distinct variables from those at play in the 
charging of individuals.”72 To this end, the Holder Memo memorialized 
eight factors that federal prosecutors should consider in determining 
whether to indict a corporation.73 These factors included: (1) the nature 
and seriousness of the offense; (2) the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing 
within the corporation; (3) the corporation’s history of similar conduct; 
(4) its timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and willingness to 
cooperate; (5) the adequacy of its compliance program; (6) the 
corporation’s remedial actions; (7) collateral consequences; and (8) the 
adequacy of non-criminal remedies.74 
While the Holder Memo injected a degree of standardization into 
an otherwise idiosyncratic corporate charging regime, it failed to provide 
parameters governing the use of DPAs. In fact, the Memo failed to even 
acknowledge the existence of DPAs as an alternative vehicle to punish 
and rehabilitate corporate wrongdoers.75 Not surprisingly, then, in 2000, 
the year after the Holder Memo was published, there remained a 
significant gulf between the number of corporate convictions and 
deferrals.76 And on the rare occasions when DPAs were employed, they 
70. See Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1871 (“Before the Justice Department recognized and
promulgated standards specific to corporate deferral in 1999, prosecutors were understandably 
hesitant to resort to the mechanism, explaining its infrequent use in the 1990s.”). 
71. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Component 
Heads & U.S. Atty’s, Federal Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder 
Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.pdf. 
72. Ryan D. McConnell et al., Plan Now or Pay Later: The Role of Compliance in Criminal Cases, 
33 Hous. J. Int’l L. 509, 534 (2011). 
73. See Holder Memo, supra note 71, at Part II. 
74. See id. 
75. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 11 (criticizing the Holder Memo’s failure to provide
any guidance regarding how to implement the eight factors when deciding whether to defer prosecution 
and its failure to mention any of the DPAs or NPAs that predated the Memo); see also Rachel Delaney, 
Comment, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
93 Marq. L. Rev. 875, 885–86 (2009) (observing that the Holder Memo was not specific to the deferred 
prosecution context, did not provide predictable rules for prosecutorial behavior, and did not provide 
protection or enforceable rights for business entities under investigation). 
76. While the number of organizational defendants convicted peaked at three hundred, see
Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1775, 1801–04 (2011), the 
number of DPAs entered into reached only two. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013 Mid-year 
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were “relatively primitive” and “less draconian” compared to the 
modern iteration of DPAs.77 
4. The Arthur Andersen Case
The collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 is generally viewed as the 
event that triggered emergence of the modern DPA.78 The events 
surrounding Arthur Andersen’s demise have been well documented.79 
Just one month after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Enron 
Corporation, one of the largest and most revered companies, shocked the 
financial community when it revealed a $610 million third-quarter loss 
and $1.2 billion reduction of shareholder equity.80 The news triggered an 
SEC investigation into Enron’s accounting practices, directly implicating 
its lead auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP.81 On October 23, 2001, after 
learning of the SEC’s investigation, David Duncan, the Andersen 
partner in charge of the Enron engagement, instructed his team to follow 
the firm’s document-retention policy.82 The unmistakable meaning of this 
message was to destroy Enron-related documents, which is exactly what 
Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2013) [hereinafter Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update]. 
77. As Professors Finder and McConnell note, early DPAs did not require an admission of
wrongdoing, did not include the appointment of a compliance monitor, and were limited to 
compliance reforms. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 5–7. It was not until the early 2000s that 
DPAs would take on a more punitive character, and their use would become widespread. See infra, 
notes 112–125 and accompanying text. 
78. See James R. Copeland, The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, Civ. Justice Rep., May 2012, at 11 (attributing the dramatic rise in DPAs to the collapse 
of Arthur Andersen); Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1436 (finding that the use of DPAs and NPAs 
“exploded after the demise of the corporate accounting giant Arthur Andersen”). 
79. For a thorough account, see generally Bethany McLean & Peter Elkind, The Smartest
Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and Scandalous Fall of Enron (2003). 
80. See Alexei Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial:
Appeals Expected, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2006, at A1. 
81. This was not the first time Arthur Andersen found itself in the government’s crosshairs. Just
months before the accounting improprieties at Enron came to light, Andersen settled a lawsuit 
brought against it by the SEC for its role in the $1.7 billion accounting fraud at Waste Management 
Inc. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Fines Arthur Andersen in Fraud Case: Big 5 Firm to Pay $7 Million 
After Inquiry of Audits for Waste Management, Wall St. J., June 20, 2001, at A3. Under the 
settlement agreement, Andersen was required to, among other things, pay $7 million in fines—at the 
time, the largest fine ever imposed against an accounting firm. See id.; see also Kathleen F. Brickey, 
Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L. Q. 917, 922–24 (2003) (describing the settlement 
agreement that Andersen entered into with the SEC). Indeed, “the Waste Management litigation was 
the first time the SEC had ever accused a major accounting firm of securities fraud in connection with 
a failed audit.” Id. at 922. The settlement agreement also enjoined Andersen from committing future 
violations of federal securities laws. Id. at 923. 
82. See Dan Ackman, Duncan Fingers Former Firm, Forbes (May 14, 2002, 8:53 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/05/14/0514topnews.html (quoting David Duncan as saying: “I instructed 
people on the Enron engagement team to follow the document-retention policy, which I knew would 
result in the destruction of documents”). David Duncan pleaded guilty to a single count of obstruction 
of justice—the same charge Andersen faced. Id. 
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transpired en masse.83 The document destruction ceased one week after it 
began, when the SEC issued a subpoena to Andersen to turn over its 
Enron-related work.84 Andersen’s counsel learned of the massive 
destruction of documents in the process of responding to this and other 
subpoenas.85 
Recognizing that a “criminal indictment would be tantamount to a 
death sentence,”86 Andersen went to great lengths to convince the Justice 
Department that it need not put the entire firm out of business because 
of the actions of a few.87 The key sticking point in the negotiations was 
the prosecutors’ insistence that Andersen admit wrongdoing as a firm, a 
non-option for Andersen because it would qualify as a clear violation of 
an earlier SEC injunction.88 Andersen’s proposed compromise was to 
admit that some of its employees engaged in wrongdoing, but not the 
entire firm.89 
The DOJ refused to accept this proposal,90 however, and on 
March 14, 2002, Andersen was indicted on one felony count of obstructing 
justice. One month later, on June 15, 2002, a jury found the firm guilty. 
Andersen was subsequently fined $500,000 and sentenced to five years 
probation.91 By this time, however, the firm’s fate was already sealed. 
After the grand jury issued the indictment, the firm could no longer audit 
public companies.92 Andersen folded, and with it 28,000 employees lost 
their jobs.93 
83. See id. 
84. See Brickey, supra note 81, at 920 (reporting that Andersen’s destruction of Enron-related
documents began on October 23, 2001, and ended on November 9, 2001—a day after it received a subpoena 
from the SEC). There was, of course, nothing routine about the document destruction. See id. at 935 n.93 
(noting that a spokesmen for Arthur Andersen “admitted that the shredding was not routine”). 
85. See id. at 935. 
86. Id. at 921. 
87. Andersen promised to, among other things: (1) clean house in its management ranks;
(2) institute a new system of compliance; and (3) appoint an independent monitor to ensure that its 
employees would abide by the law going forward. Id. at 924–25. Andersen also waged a $1.5 million 
public relations campaign to rehabilitate its image and “humanize [its] plight.” See id. at 942 n.129. 
Among its public-relations moves was hiring former chair of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker, to 
head an independent oversight board to identify and remedy management and accountability 
problems. See James Kelly, The Power of an Indictment and the Demise of Arthur Andersen, 48 S. Tex. 
L. Rev. 509, 513 (2006); see also Brickey, supra note 81, at 942 (describing Enron-staged 
demonstrations in Houston, Philadelphia, and Washington D.C.). 
88. Id. at 925–26. 
89. Id. at 926. 
90. See id. at 926. 
91. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005). 
92. See Finder & McConnell, supra note 8, at 14–15 (“With the criminal indictment, [Andersen]
could no longer audit public companies. Twenty-eight thousand people lost their jobs and Arthur 
Andersen became a shell of its former self.”).  
93. See id. 
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5. The Post-Andersen Era and the Rise of the Modern DPA
The fallout from Arthur Andersen’s collapse was immediate and 
profound. The image of 28,000 people left jobless and one of the nation’s 
largest accounting firms being put out of business—when only a few 
wrongdoers had been identified—drew allegations of prosecutorial 
excess.94 This was especially so after Andersen’s conviction was reversed 
by the Supreme Court in 2005.95 The lesson of the Andersen case was 
that “a federal indictment could cripple even a strong, well-established 
company.”96 
Immense political pressure to avoid a repeat of the Andersen effect 
forced the DOJ to take a hard look at its corporate charging policies. What 
followed was a dramatic shift away from the traditional indict/decline 
charging framework for corporate defendants in favor of DPAs.97 
This shift began with the establishment of the Corporate Fraud Task 
Force in July 2002,98 which President George W. Bush created in 
response to Enron and a series of high-profile corporate fraud scandals 
94. Mary Jo White called the decision to indict Arthur Andersen “‘very wrongheaded’, and a
sacrifice of the best interests of the public in order to ‘message send.’” Alan C. Michaels, Fastow & 
Arthur Andersen: Some Reflections on Corporate Criminality, Victim Status, and Retribution, 1 Ohio 
St. J. Crim. L. 551, 560 n.39 (2004) (citation omitted). Other former federal prosecutors chastised the 
Justice Department for hanging Andersen for “the actions of a few.” John C. Danforth, Op-Ed., When 
Enforcement Becomes Harassment, N.Y. Times, May 6, 2003, at A31. The defense bar sounded similar 
criticisms, calling the Andersen prosecution “heavy-handed” and an unnecessary “death penalty.” 
Elkan Abramowitz & Barry Bohrer, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, N.Y. 
L.J., Mar. 4, 2003, at 1. 
95. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 708. 
96. Christopher Garcia et al., Collateral Consequences of the UBS and RBS Settlements, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2013/03/12/collateral-consequences-of-the-ubs-and-rbs-libor-settlements. 
97. See Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan Sack, The ‘Civil-izing’ of White-Collar Criminal
Enforcement, N.Y. L.J., May 7, 2013, at 1 (discussing the post-Arthur Andersen shift away from the 
criminal prosecution of “among others, banks, pharmaceutical companies and military contractors”). 
The Justice Department’s resolve to use greater caution before indicting a multi-national corporation 
was put to the test only a few months after the Andersen prosecution, when another accounting 
scandal came to light, this time involving Worldcom—then the nation’s second largest long distance 
telecommunications company. See Jared Sandberg et al., Disconnected: Inside WorldCom’s Unearthing 
of a Vast Accounting Scandal—Internal Auditor Discovered an Unorthodox Treatment of Long-
Distance Expenses—CFO’s Impassioned Defense, Wall St. J., June 27, 2002, at A1 (detailing nature 
of alleged accounting fraud). While Worldcom’s misdeeds were no less egregious than Andersen’s, the 
scandal’s revelation coincided with the Andersen backlash directed at the Justice Department. Indeed, 
Eric Holder, at the time a former Deputy Attorney General, authored an op-ed in the Wall Street 
Journal, entreating his former employer not to indict Worldcom. See Eric Holder, Op-Ed., Don’t 
Indict Worldcom, Wall St. J., July 30, 2002, at A14. Holder’s pointed message was: “as public and 
political pressures mount for high-profile convictions, the Justice Department must remain true to the 
core principles that guide it in the use of its enormous, discretionary power,” and not “feel compelled 
to indict more corporations simply because they can.” Id. 
98. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 13271 (2002). The Corporate Fraud Task Force has since
been renamed the Financial Fraud Task Force, which President Barack Obama created in 2009. Exec. 
Order No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 13519 (2009). 
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that shook investor confidence.99 The task force’s objective was “to hold 
wrongdoers responsible and to restore an atmosphere of accountability 
and integrity within corporations across the country.”100 To that end, the 
task force sought to increase interagency coordination in combating 
corporate fraud and punishing corporate wrongdoers,101 and provide for 
more coordination between U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country 
that were beginning to prosecute white-collar crimes.102 
Another important development was the publication by then-
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson of a revised set of guidelines 
to govern corporate prosecutions.103 The “Thompson Memo,” as it is 
commonly called, was virtually identical to its predecessor, the Holder 
Memo,104 with one critical difference: the Thompson Memo explicitly 
recognized pre-trial diversion as a viable option to reward a corporation’s 
authentic cooperation.105 Although it did not specifically direct prosecutors 
to weigh the DPA option before indicting a company, the Thompson 
Memo nevertheless “confirmed the status of DPAs . . . as arrows in the 
government’s quiver.”106 Combined with a lingering aversion to triggering 
another Arthur Andersen-style collapse, it opened the door to widespread 
adoption of DPAs.107 
The Justice Department’s wholesale shift in favor of DPAs is 
evidenced dramatically by the statistics. From 1994 to 2001, the DOJ 
99. See Andrew Weismann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 Ind. 
L.J. 411, 424 n.43 (2007) (discussing the post Enron shift to DPAs to “settle accounting fraud 
investigations with a series of major corporations or their subsidiaries”). 
 100. The President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf (last visited June 1, 2014). 
101. See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. 13271.  
 102. See Weissman & Newman, supra note 99, at 425 n.46. The engagement of a broader universe 
of U.S. Attorney’s Offices in white-collar cases represented a departure from past practice, as large 
financial crime cases had generally been prosecuted out of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New 
York, or DOJ headquarters in Washington. See Peikin, supra note 34. 
103. Thompson Memo, supra note 9. 
104. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that the 
Thompson Memo was “in many respects . . . a modest revision of the Holder Memorandum”). 
 105. See Thompson Memo, supra note 9, at pt. IV.B; Resnik & Dougall, supra note 3, at 1 
(explaining that the Thompson Memo’s “significance lay in its highlighting of alternatives to corporate 
indictment”). The Thompson Memo also instructed prosecutors to consider the “collateral 
consequences” of indictment on “shareholders, pension holders and employees not proven personally 
culpable.” Thompson Memo, supra note 9, at 3. 
106. Spivack & Raman, supra note 47, at 166 n.40. 
 107. See id. at 166 (stating that the Thompson Memo formalized the recognition of a DPA as “an 
alternative somewhere in between the ‘all-or-nothing choice between indicting (and destroying) a 
company and giving it a complete ‘pass’”) (quoting Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate 
Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 1095, 1103 (2006)); Greenblum, supra note 36, at 1875 n.84 (“There is consensus . . . that the 
Thompson Memo was ultimately a catalyst for an increase in corporate deferrals.”); Peikin, supra note 34 
(“Since 2003, prosecutors have signed DPAs with an unprecedented number of corporations.”). 
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resolved only seven corporate criminal cases via DPAs.108 Since then, the 
DOJ has entered into over 250 DPAs,109 with 100 executed between 2010 
and 2012 alone.110 The organizational defendants that have been parties to 
these deferrals, moreover, are among the most well-known multinational 
corporations.111 
The dramatic uptick in the use of DPAs is not the only remarkable 
aspect of the Justice Department’s shift in charging practice. As the use 
of DPAs has increased, so too has the severity of the conditions 
prosecutors have imposed on corporate defendants. The DPAs that have 
been employed in the post-Andersen era have commonly included 
extremely stiff monetary penalties or restitution to victims.112 Since 2000, 
for example, prosecutors have extracted over $31.6 billion from corporate 
entities, with more than $9 billion coming in 2012.113 Between 2005 and 
2013, total monetary penalties exceeded the billion dollar threshold.114 
Modern DPAs can also include the filing of detailed criminal charges115 
and some sort of admission or acknowledgement of responsibility on the 
company’s part.116 Notably, the defendant is not, under any circumstances, 
 108. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, U. Va. 
Sch. of L. (Apr. 28, 2013), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp. 
 109. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2012 Year-end Update on Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2013). Since 2006, 
the Justice Department has entered into at least twenty agreements every year, with the exception of 
2009, when it entered into nineteen. See Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update, supra note 76, at 1. 
 110. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2012 Year-end Update on Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2013). 
 111. Approximately sixty-one percent of the corporations entering into DPAs from 2001 to 2012 
were public companies or their subsidiaries. See Brandon L. Garrett & David Zaring, For a Better Way 
to Prosecute Corporations, Look Overseas, N.Y. Times DealBook (Sept. 24, 2013, 3:43 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/for-a-better-way-to-prosecute-corporations-look-overseas. 
Almost one third were Fortune 500 or Global 500 companies. Id. Forbes Magazine has referred to this 
list of well-known, multi-national corporations as “Club Fed Deferred.” Janet Novack, Club Fed, 
Deferred, Forbes (Aug. 24, 2005, 8:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/08/24/kpmg-taxes-deferred-
cz_jn_0824beltway.html. 
112. See Peikin, supra note 34. 
113. See Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update, supra note 76, at 1. 
114. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2013 Year-end Update on Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) 1 (2014). 
115. See Peikin, supra note 34. 
 116. An admission of wrongdoing is standard fare in the modern DPA. The rationale for requiring 
a corporate defendant to “admit a criminal violation and the facts making out that violation,” is to 
communicate the same message of wrongdoing as a criminal proceeding. See Samuel W. Buell, 
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in Prosecutors in the Boardroom: Using 
Criminal Law to Regulate Corporate Conduct 91 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 
2011) (“[A] DPA is crafted to retain some of the message effects of a criminal proceeding”). The 
consequences of such an admission can be devastating if used against the defendant in a collateral civil 
proceeding. See Sarah Kelly-Kilgore & Emily M. Smith, Corporate Criminal Liability, 48 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 421, 453 n.227 (2011) (stating that a corporate defendant’s admission of wrongdoing “will be 
admissible in subsequent civil litigation and disclosures will likely be discoverable”); Jonathan S. Sack 
& Elizabeth Haines, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
Can be Used in Civil Litigation, Bloomberg L. (Jan. 10, 2012), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/ 
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permitted to publicly contest or dispute its admission of wrongdoing—a 
requirement that can have devastating consequences in collateral civil 
proceedings.117 Modern DPAs further have incorporated obligations of 
ongoing cooperation with the government, including the appointment of 
corporate monitors118 and compulsory adherence to separate agreements 
reached with securities or banking regulators.119 
Finally, post-Andersen DPAs generally include undertakings to 
make significant structural and procedural reforms. Among the more 
common are changes to the composition of the board of directors;120 
terminating specific officers and employees;121 improving compliance and 
ethics procedures;122 exiting specific lines of business;123 and establishing 
practitioner-contributions/deferred-and-non-prosecution-agreements (arguing that factual admissions 
in a DPA should be admissible as a an admission by a party opponent under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)); Michael R. Sklaire & Joshua G. Berman, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: 
What is the Cost of Staying in Business?, Wash. Legal Found., June 3, 2005, at 2 (“While a company is 
not required to admit guilt as part of the agreement, the company very often will be required to 
stipulate to the Government’s presentation of facts—a stipulation that a plaintiff will seek to use 
against the corporation in a later civil proceeding.”). 
117. Professor Michael Koehler has aptly coined this standard DPA provision, a “muzzle clause.” 
Michael Koehler, The ‘Muzzle’ Clause, FCPA Professor (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-muzzle-clause. 
 118. The corporate monitor is generally mutually agreed upon. Peikin, supra note 34. The 
monitor’s duties include reviewing relevant areas of the company’s business and filing periodic reports 
to the government about the corporation’s business and compliance with the DPA. Id. The costs 
associated with corporate monitors can easily run into the millions of dollars. See Spivack & Raman, 
supra note 47, at 185 (“[T]the simple fact of monitoring can alone cost a company, and its 
shareholders, millions of dollars.”). The most prominent example of this came in 2008 when it was 
widely reported that former Attorney General John Ashcroft’s consulting firm was awarded an 
eighteen month contract valued at $52 million, in connection with the firm’s duties as corporate 
monitor for Zimmer Holdings, a medical device company. See Eric Lichtblau, In Justice Shift, 
Corporate Deals Replace Trials, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2008, at A1. 
 119. DPAs frequently refer to separate agreements between the cooperating defendant and 
banking and securities regulators, and condition deferral on compliance with such agreements. See 
Peikin, supra note 34. The requirement to continue cooperating with the government can also be 
explicit about the type of cooperation to be provided. Id. This includes the requirement to assemble 
and organize records, make available any current or former officers or employees, and provide 
testimony to establish the authenticity of business records. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 12, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. 
(No. 04-0837) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Computer Associates DPA] (requiring Computer 
Associates to add three independent directors to its board). 
 121. While it is rare for a DPA to expressly contemplate terminating key employees, it is not 
uncommon for prosecutors to informally demand such terminations. For example, it has been widely 
reported that in connection with the DPA Bristol Meyers-Squibb entered into in 2005, Chris Christie, 
the then-U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, demanded the ouster of Bristol Meyers-
Squibb’s CEO, Peter Dolan. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 Ind. L.J. 1035, 
1070–71 (2008); see also Brooke A. Masters, Bristol-Meyers Ousts Its Chief at Monitor’s Urging; Dolan 
Had Led Firm Since 2001, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 2006, at D1. 
 122. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 11, United States v. Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. (No. 12-
0169) (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2012) (requiring implementation of compliance and ethics program to prevent 
and detect violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
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business oversight and review committees.124 While the central aim of these 
reforms is purportedly rehabilitative, they have been known to include 
obligations that bear no relation to the criminal conduct at hand.125 
II. The Benefits and Drawbacks of the Modern DPA Regime
A. Common Criticisms of the Modern DPA 
The Justice Department’s resort to the modern DPA as the 
preferred measure in the corporate crime context has been a magnet for 
criticism. Some have expressed the view that DPAs do not achieve the 
objectives of criminal sanctions because they are not sufficiently punitive 
and do not deter future violations of the criminal law.126 Most, however, 
contend that DPAs invite an unhealthy degree of prosecutorial excess.127 
One way in which the potential for excess manifests is prosecutorial 
intrusion into matters of corporate governance. The prosecutor’s role is 
generally understood to be limited to determining whether a given case 
merits federal prosecution and, if so, which charges should be brought.128 
With deferred prosecutions, however, prosecutors have been tempted 
 123. A recent example of this is the HSBC DPA, which required HSBC to exit a number of 
profitable lines of business. Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 5k, United States v. HSBC USA, N.A. 
(No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2012) (requiring HSBC to exit the bank notes business). 
 124. See, e.g., Computer Associates DPA, supra note 120, ¶¶ 12(b)–(c) (requiring Computer 
Associates to establish a compliance committee and disclosure committee). 
 125. The most prominent example of this is the Bristol Meyers-Squibb DPA, which required the 
company to endow a business ethics chair at Seton Hall University School of Law—the alma mater of 
the then-U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, Chris Christie. Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement ¶ 20, SEC v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb (Civ. No. 04-3680 (FSH)) (2006), available at 
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/sites/default/files/pdf/bristol-meyers.pdf. 
126. Professor Mike Koehler has argued that prosecutors’ reliance on DPAs “allow egregious 
instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly . . . . without adequate sanctions and without 
achieving maximum deterrence.” See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the 
Microscope, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 1, 19 (2012); see also Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, The 
Debate About Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 6, 2012, at 3 (discussing the 
view that DPAs and NPAs “allow[] corporate criminals to receive no more than a slap on the wrist 
and making the decision to police criminal activity within a corporation ‘just another dollars-and-cents 
decision’”) (citation omitted); David M. Uhlmann, Op-Ed., Prosecution Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 13, 2013, at A23 (“The failure to prosecute the likes of JPMorgan, HSBC and Massey 
minimizes their culpability and raises doubts about the government’s commitment to fighting 
corporate crime.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1458 (“[P]rosecution agreement[s] . . . offer[] a relatively one-
sided negotiation where the prosecutor can ask for almost anything.”). While we do not suggest that 
prosecutors make a conscious decision to exploit the power they possess, “they are, like the rest of us, 
only human.” Jeffrey S. Parker, Developing Consensus Solutions to Overcriminalization Problems: The 
Way Ahead, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y, 725, 735 (2011) (cautioning against relying on prosecutorial discretion 
to cabin Congress’s over criminalization). And, as John Coffee has observed, there is no denying that 
“power corrupts and . . . prosecutors are starting to possess something close to absolute power.” John C. 
Coffee Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has it Gone Too Far?, Nat’l L.J., July 25, 2005, at 13. 
 128. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge 
to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”). 
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“to experiment with corporate governance in ways that exceed their 
competence or entitlement.”129 Critics contend that a continued 
government presence in the daily affairs of a corporation can act as a 
drag on company’s business development and stock price.130 These critics 
believe that the government should withdraw when a corporation has 
responded appropriately to past wrongdoing and corrected deficiencies 
in controls, compliance, and corporate culture.131 Indeed, Mary Jo White, 
one of the most vocal critics of the potential for prosecutorial excess in 
the use of DPAs despite having pioneered their use in corporate criminal 
cases, has cautioned: “For a prosecutor to get into the business of 
changing corporate culture is skating on fairly thin ice.”132 
In addition to prosecutorial intrusion into corporate affairs, critics 
argue that the risk of collateral consequences of a criminal indictment—
that is, the risk of an Arthur Andersen-style collapse—leaves corporations 
with no choice but to settle at all costs.133 The corporations are therefore 
compelled to agree to the prosecutors’ terms, vesting nearly absolute 
power in the government’s hands.134 Armed with this unchecked power, 
prosecutors are free to assume “the role of judge (interpreting the law) 
and of legislature (setting broad policy choices about industry conduct).”135 
Moreover, without the option to take the government to trial or the 
availability of appellate review, “prosecutors can too easily take advantage 
 129. Coffee, supra note 127. The inclusion of corporate governance reforms in DPAs is by no means a 
modern innovation. In regard to the nature of these reforms, “the intrusiveness of . . . corporate decision-
making has recently increased.” See id.; see also Garrett, supra note 38, at 936 (“Federal prosecutors have 
stepped far outside of their traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in doing so, seek to reshape the 
governance of leading corporations, public entities, and ultimately entire industries.”); Mary Jo White, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, in 37th Annual Institute on Securities 
Regulation 815, 820 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1517, 2005) (describing 
prosecutors’ use of DPAs to “force companies to behave and reform themselves as the prosecutors, 
fashioning themselves as the new corporate governance experts”). 
 130. White, supra note 129 (“[Government intrusion] can . . . retard further progress and act as a 
drag on the company’s business and stock price”). 
 131. See id. (“Most cases of corporate crime should result in no action by the government against 
corporations that have responded appropriately to the wrongdoing and any remaining problems of 
controls, compliance and corporate culture. There is no need for continued government presence.”). 
132. White Interview, supra note 65. 
 133. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1436 (“It has become increasingly clear that the government 
holds all the cards in negotiations over [DPAs]. As long as the threat of prosecution lingers over a 
company, the corporation is compelled to agree to the prosecutor’s terms, vesting nearly absolute 
power in the government’s hands.”); id. at 1457 (“Without the threat of trial, however, there is no 
assurance that the prosecutor is acting in a judicious manner.”); Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA 
Enforcement, 41 Geo. J. Int’l L. 907, 997 (2010) (prosecutors occupy positions of “advocate, judge, 
and rule-maker,” and “induce settlement through the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ they possess even though 
many of the enforcement theories leading to these resolutions are untested and dubious”). 
134. See Copeland, supra note 78, at 12; see also Paulsen, supra note 9, at 1459. 
135. See Copeland, supra note 78, at 12; see also Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: 
Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 77, 87 (2010). 
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of vague criminal statutes to pursue new and inappropriate theories of 
criminal conduct.”136 
In sum, as currently employed in the corporate crime context, the 
deferred prosecution is viewed as placing too much unfettered discretion 
in the hands of the DOJ. 
B. Arguments in Support of Modern DPAs 
Despite the potential they create for prosecutorial abuse, DPAs 
have become the preferred method of resolving corporate criminal 
investigations in the post-Andersen era because modern DPAs are 
widely regarded as providing substantial benefits to both the Justice 
Department and corporations. From the corporations’ perspective, the 
advantages are easy to understand. The Andersen case painted a vivid 
picture of the devastating consequences of a corporate prosecution.137 
Since Andersen, no corporations have collapsed after entering into 
DPAs with the government. The prospect of avoiding the stigma of 
criminal charges and a possible death sentence therefore makes pretrial 
diversion the preferable alternative. 
From the Justice Department’s perspective, DPAs minimize the 
likelihood of collateral damage while allowing the DOJ to achieve most 
of its desired remedies.138 Filing a criminal charge permits the 
government to express its negative view of the corporation’s conduct 
publicly, sending a message of the kind of behavior that it will not 
 136. See Michael N. Levy, Prosecutorial Common Law? A Reality in the Absence of Timely 
Appellate Review, McKee Nelson LLP White Collar/Investigations and Enforcement, Spring 
2008, at 1 (2008). As Professor William J. Stunz noted, the risk of convicting an innocent defendant is 
particularly acute in white-collar cases. See William J. Stunz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 Va. L. Rev. 
1871, 1883 (2000). In contrast to street crime, the challenge for prosecutors is not proving that the 
“defendant did something;” rather, “what isn’t clear is whether what the defendant did amounts to 
fraud.” See id.; see also Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311, 339–40 (2007). Nowhere is this more relevant than in the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) prosecutions. Many key provisions of the FCPA are ambiguous. See 
generally Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The “Dominant Influence” Test: The FCPA’s 
“Instrumentality” and “Foreign Official” Requirements and the Investment Activity of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, 39 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (2011). Prosecutors have taken advantage of this ambiguity to adopt ever 
more aggressive interpretations in negotiations with corporate defendants that are all too uneasy to go 
to trial. See id. at 27; see also John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an 
Expanding FCPA, 26 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 25, 33 (2012) (crediting DPAs for the 
expansion of FCPA enforcement activity). Despite the U.S. government’s aggressive interpretation of 
the FCPA’s provisions, virtually no corporate defendants, big or small, have contested FCPA charges 
in court for the past two decades. Id. Instead, corporations routinely settle FCPA charges through 
DPAs and NPAs—a practice that has immunized the Justice Department’s enforcement theories from 
any meaningful scrutiny. The upshot, critics contend, is that the FCPA means “what the enforcement 
agencies say it means.” Levy, supra, at 1. 
137. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 138. Garrett, supra note 38, at 855 (stating that DPAs allow organizations to “avoid[] the collateral 
consequences of an indictment” while achieving institutional reform). 
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condone.139 In addition, the large fines that have been an element of 
modern DPAs are an effective method for exacting punishment and 
making restitution.140 DPAs further permit the DOJ to ensure good 
corporate citizenship by mandating specific reforms, controlling how 
future business is conducted, monitoring the corporation’s behavior, and 
threatening prosecution should the corporation fail to comply with the 
DPA.141 
Finally, the prevalence of DPAs can to some degree be attributed to 
corporations having satisfied the government’s expectations in responding 
to criminal investigations. DPAs often cite corporate cooperation and the 
undertaking of remedial measures as reason for deferring prosecution. 
DPAs can therefore be seen as a tangible reward for positive behavior, 
particularly in the face of a criminal investigation. 
It is for all of the above reasons that then-Assistant Attorney General 
Lanny Breuer opined: 
A DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a 
guilty plea: when a company enters into a DPA with the government, 
or an NPA for that matter, it almost always must acknowledge 
wrongdoing, agree to cooperate with the government’s investigation, 
pay a fine, agree to improve its compliance program, and agree to face 
prosecution if it fails to satisfy the terms of the agreement. All of these 
components of DPAs are critical for accountability.142 
III. The Post-Financial Crisis Period and the Emergence of the
“Too Big to Jail” Construct 
A. Sowing the Seeds of “Too Big to Jail” 
The financial crisis of 2008 wreaked havoc on Main Street and Wall 
Street and was followed by a deep global economic downturn.143 In the 
aftermath of the crisis, the Justice Department came under increasing 
political pressure to take tougher measures against financial institutions 
deemed responsible for triggering the collapse.144 As a consequence, the 
DOJ’s historical reliance on DPAs has been called into question. 
139. See Buell, supra note 116, at 91. 
 140. Indeed, in this respect, DPAs may be more effective than prosecution, since they allow the 
government to set fines without regard to statutory limits, and collect restitution without complying 
with the often cumbersome restitution statute (i.e., without loss calculations, identifying specific 
victims and complying with strict jurisdictional time limits). See Peikin, supra note 34, at 5. 
141. See id. 
142. See Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the New York City Bar Association, 
Justice News (Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Breuer’s N.Y. City Bar Remarks], 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-1209131.html.  
 143. For a brief primer on the causes of the financial crisis, see Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson, Restoring Financial Stability 12–25 (2009) (examining causes of the financial crisis). 
 144. Many wondered whether the DOJ would employ the same “brass-knuckle” approach it used 
in the wake of the savings and loan crisis, when it launched thousands of prosecutions, or whether it 
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The political scrutiny can be traced to May 2009, when Congress 
established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) to 
examine the causes of the financial crisis and determine whether it was 
preventable.145 Among the FCIC’s findings was that the crisis resulted 
from failings of regulators and the financial services sector. According to 
the FCIC, the regulators failed to “critically challenge the institutions 
and the entire system they were entrusted to oversee,”146 and the banks’ 
“misjudgments . . . and misdeeds . . . resulted in systemic failures for 
which our nation has paid dearly.”147 The FCIC also intimated that a 
contributing cause of the financial crisis was widespread mortgage and 
securities fraud.148 
While the FCIC’s conclusions had no legal significance, the 
committee’s report contributed to the perception that criminally culpable 
conduct on the part of financial institutions was a contributing cause of the 
crisis.149 Nevertheless, and in stark contrast to the savings-and-loan crisis of 
the 1980s,150 not a single financial institution, and few financial institution 
employees, were criminally prosecuted for their actions.151 
would continue its post-Andersen approach of settling with rather than prosecuting corporate 
wrongdoers. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, As Wall St. Polices Itself, Prosecutors Use Softer 
Approach, N.Y. Times (July 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/business/in-shift-federal-
prosecutors-are-lenient-as-companies-break-the-law.html. 
 145. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 5(a), 123 Stat. 1617, 
1626–27. (establishing the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission). 
 146. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Complete with 
Dissenting Views xviii (2011). 
147. Id. 
 148. Id. at xxii–xxiii (explaining that the FCIC found high rates of mortgage fraud, which 
executives continued to engage in even with the threat of a “financial and reputational catastrophe”). 
149. See Peter J. Henning, Making Misconduct a Crime, N.Y. Times DealBook (June 24, 2013, 
2:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/making-mismanagement-a-crime (describing the 
popular view that criminal conduct by corporations, particularly Wall Street and other financial firms, 
contributed significantly to the losses suffered by investors and the broader economy). 
 150. See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 13, 2011, at A1. 
 151. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 9, 2014 (questioning the “striking contrast” between the number 
of prosecutions brought during the savings-and-loan era and the 2008 financial crisis); see also David 
Zaring, The Post-Crisis and Its Critics, 12 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 1169, 1169 n.2 (2010) (noting the deep 
disparity between the amount of convictions secured after the savings and loan crisis in the early 1990s 
and late 1980s and the lack of any convictions after the financial crisis of 2008); Joe Nocera, Biggest 
Fish Face Little Risk of Being Caught, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1 (“Two and a half years after the 
world’s financial system nearly collapsed, you’re entitled to wonder whether any of the highly paid 
executives who helped kindle the disaster will ever see jail time—like Michael Milken in the 1980s, or 
Jeffrey Skilling after the Enron disaster. Increasingly, the answer appears to be no. The harder 
question, though, is whether anybody should.”); Shahien Nasiripour, Financial Crisis Prosecutions on 
Wall Street Slow to Develop Despite Cries for Justice, Huffington Post (Feb. 4, 2011, 3:24 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/04/financial-crisis-prosecutions-wall-street-
slow_n_818851.html (noting that in connection with savings-and-loan crisis “roughly 3,800 bankers 
were prosecuted and sentenced to prison terms”). 
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Defenders of the DOJ’s record attribute the lack of prosecutions to 
the difficulty establishing criminal intent in complex financial fraud 
cases.152 They also contend that the root cause of the financial crisis was 
more likely greed and poor judgment than criminal wrongdoing.153 As 
then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer stated, when prosecutors 
“cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was criminal intent, 
then [they] have a constitutional duty not to bring those cases.”154 
While the Justice Department’s failure to prosecute financial 
institutions for their role in the financial crisis can legitimately be 
attributed to the inability to establish that a crime occurred, the desire to 
avoid the Andersen effect was clearly a consideration as well. In a telling 
September 2012 speech to the New York City Bar Association, then-
Assistant Attorney General Breuer shed light on the principal factor 
driving prosecutors’ decision whether to advance criminal charges 
against an organizational defendant. According to Breuer, it was not the 
nature of the criminal offense, nor was it the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within a corporation.155 Rather, the decisive factor was “the 
 152. Many commentators have made the point that in complex financial cases, criminal intent is 
hard to prove “because prosecutors must convince jurors, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a fraud was 
intentional.” Jean Eaglesham, Financial Crimes Bedevil Prosecutors, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 2011, at C1. 
This is difficult to do in light of the fact that financial crisis investigations are backward looking. That 
is, prosecutors step in only long after the fraudulent conduct has taken place, and in turn the 
opportunity to gather evidence in a clandestine manner has long passed. See George Packer, A Dirty 
Business: New York City’s Top Prosecutor Takes on Wall Street Crime, New Yorker (June 27, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/06/27/110627fa_fact_packer?currentPage=all (“[C]riminal 
law often founders in what prosecutors call a ‘dead-body case.’ During the mortgage bubble, the 
possible crimes were committed before any investigation had begun. By the time the government 
could have gathered enough evidence to obtain wiretaps, any incriminating conversations would have long 
since taken place.”). As evidence of the difficulty in investigating and prosecuting complex financial fraud 
cases, commentators point to the inability of federal prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York to 
secure convictions against two former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers who were alleged to have 
committed securities fraud in connection with the collapse of the investment funds they managed. See 
Zachery Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders are Acquitted, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 2009, at A1. 
153. See Eaglesham, supra note 152; Peter J. Henning, Making Misconduct a Crime, N.Y. Times 
DealBook (June 24, 2013, 2:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/24/making-
mismanagement-a-crime (“For all the talk about how the financial crisis must have entailed fraud, 
much of the conduct during that period seemed to involve a headlong rush into risky transactions 
without understanding the consequences.”); Packer, supra note 152 (“At the other extreme is the 
argument that the crisis was caused simply by greed and stupidity, which remain legal under federal 
law.”); see also id. (quoting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet Bharara, who 
remarked that “[p]eople who did bad things . . . should get punished . . . . Doesn’t mean it’s a criminal 
act. There are lots of bad people out there who I can’t charge criminally.”). 
 154. See Lanny Breuer: Financial Fraud, Frontline (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:42 PM) [hereinafter Breuer 
Interview], available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/ 
untouchables/lanny-breuer-financial-fraud-has-not-gone-unpunished. Breuer’s comments also 
confirmed that the financial crisis of 2008 and ensuing recession have amplified the DOJ’s concerns 
about collateral consequences. 
155. See Breuer’s N.Y. City Bar Remarks, supra note 142. 
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effect of an indictment on innocent employees and shareholders.”156 
Indeed, the “sober[ing] predictions that a company or bank might fail if we 
indict” was the sort of “consideration[] . . . that literally ke[pt] [Breuer] up 
at night.”157 Breuer went on to suggest that to properly discharge their 
prosecutorial duties, prosecutors should consult with regulators and 
experts to better understand the economic effect of bringing a criminal 
case against a large institution.158 
B. HSBC: “Too Big to Jail”? 
1. The Deferred Prosecution of HSBC
On December 11, 2012, a few months after Breuer delivered his 
speech, Justice Department officials announced that the DOJ had 
entered into a DPA with HSBC159 despite evidence that the bank had 
laundered hundreds of millions in narcotics proceeds for Mexican and 
Colombian cartels and facilitated transactions with entities in Cuba, Iran, 
and other jurisdictions subject to U.S. government sanctions.160 The four-
count information charged HSBC with violations of the Bank Secrecy 
Act (“BSA”),161 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(“IEEPA”),162 and the Trading with the Enemy Act (“TWEA”).163 
According to the joint Statement of Facts, from 2006 to 2010, two 
well-known Colombian and Mexican drug cartels164 laundered at least 
 156. Prosecutors, Breuer contended, have a “duty to consider whether individual employees with 
no responsibility for, or knowledge of, misconduct committed by others in the same company are 
going to lose their livelihood if [they] indict the corporation.” Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4. The named defendants were HSBC Holdings and 
its subsidiary, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. For ease of reference, we refer to both as simply “HSBC.” 
160. Id. 
 161. See DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2012). 
Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 to address an increase in criminal money laundering 
activity through financial institutions. See Colin Watterson, Note, More Flies with Honey: Encouraging 
Formal Channel Remittances to Combat Money Laundering, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 711, 723–24 (2013). In 
2001, Congress included in the USA PATRIOT Act an amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act, which 
required domestic financial institutions to establish and maintain effective anti-money laundering 
programs. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h). The amendment was included to “ensure that financial institutions of 
all sizes implement programs to combat their vulnerabilities to those who would seek to use them to 
transfer or launder illegal funds.” 147 Cong. Rec. H7129, H7204 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001). If the 
financial institution’s failure to establish or maintain an effective anti-money-laundering program is 
“willful,” it is subject to criminal penalties. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322. 
162. See DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; see also 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702, 1705 (2012). 
163. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 3, 5, 16 (2012). For a detailed discussion of the Justice Department’s charges 
against HSBC, see DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4. 
 164. These cartels included the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico and the Norte del Valle Cartel in 
Colombia. See Statement of Facts ¶ 9, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 
2013) [hereinafter HSBC Statement of Facts]; see also Robert Mazur, Op-Ed., How to Halt the 
Terrorist Money Train, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 2013, at A25 (referencing a House report, which 
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$881 million through HSBC without detection.165 HSBC’s inability to 
identify this activity was due in large part to its downsized and 
underfunded anti-money-laundering program.166 HSBC allegedly viewed 
its anti-money-laundering program as an “area where resources could be 
cut to increase profits,”167 rather than a bulwark against money laundering. 
In light of these deficiencies, prosecutors charged HSBC with willfully 
failing to maintain an effective anti-money-laundering program168 and 
willfully failing to conduct and maintain due diligence on correspondent 
bank accounts held on behalf of foreign persons169 in violation of the 
BSA.170 
The Statement of Facts also alleged that HSBC violated the IEEPA 
and the TWEA when, from the mid-1990s until around 2006, it knowingly 
accepted hundreds of millions of dollars sourced from customers located in 
Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Burma—all of which were subject to 
sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.171 According 
to prosecutors, HSBC went to great lengths to disguise many of the 
transactions coming from these countries.172 The upshot of this was that 
other U.S. banks could not properly review whether the money they 
accepted from HSBC violated U.S. sanctions. Accordingly, billions of 
dollars from these countries illegally entered the U.S. financial system.173 
“document[ed] the collaboration between Mexican and Colombian drug cartels and Hezbollah in narcotics 
and human trafficking, smuggling and financial crimes in the United States and Latin America”). 
 165. HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶ 9. The problems were so bad at HSBC that 
Mexican narcotics traffickers were “depositing hundreds of thousands of dollars in bulk U.S. currency 
each day into HSBC . . . accounts.” Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 50, United States v. HSBC 
Bank USA, (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 2013). This easily made HSBC Mexico “the preferred financial 
institution for drug cartels and money launderers.” Id. ¶ 51. 
 166. See HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶ 10(d) (describing the staffing and funding 
shortages of HSBC’s anti-money laundering program). Even HSBC’s Chief Operating Officer for 
Compliance found its anti-money laundering program to be “behind the times and in need of 
fundamental change.” Government’s Memorandum in Support of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
at 8, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter Gov’t Memorandum 
in Support of HSBC DPA] (internal quotation marks omitted). The degree to which HSBC’s anti-money-
laundering program was understaffed cannot be overstated. In March 2008, the bank had only four 
employees to review 13,000–15,000 suspicious wire alerts generated per month. HSBC Statement of Facts, 
supra note 164, ¶ 27. Today, by contrast, HSBC Bank USA has “roughly 430 employees reviewing 
suspicious wire transactions.” Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra, at 8. 
167. Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 7. 
168. See DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4; see also 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012). 
169. Id. § 5318(i). 
170. Id. §§ 5311–5332. For a detailed discussion of the conduct underlying the charges, see HSBC 
Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶¶ 8–28. 
171. HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶¶ 56–60. 
 172. For example, HSBC Europe devised a specific procedure in the 1990s to allow sanctioned 
entities to place notes in their requests or submissions of payments such that any trace of the 
sanctioned entity was removed. See HSBC Statement of Facts, supra note 164, ¶¶ 65, 74. 
173. See id. ¶ 71 n.6. 
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Despite the seriousness of the allegations against HSBC (and its 
history of noncompliance with federal anti-money-laundering laws), the 
Justice Department deferred prosecution of the bank and declined to 
pursue charges against any of its employees.174 At a press conference 
announcing the settlement, then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer 
explained that had prosecutors pursued criminal sanctions against 
HSBC, it “would almost certainly have lost its banking license in the 
U.S., the future of the institution would have been under threat and the 
entire banking system would have been destabilized.”175 “Our goal here is 
not to bring HSBC down, it’s not to cause a systemic effect on the 
economy, it’s not for people to lose thousands of jobs,” he said.176 Breuer’s 
remarks fueled speculation that potential collateral consequences had 
been the dispositive factor in the DOJ’s decision not to charge HSBC.177 
That the Justice Department did not pursue criminal charges against 
HSBC is not to say the bank was let off easily. To the contrary, the penalty 
imposed on HSBC—approximately $1.9 billion—included the largest ever 
forfeiture in a bank prosecution of $1.256 billion.178 The corporate 
governance measures HSBC agreed to undertake were likewise expansive. 
Among other changes, HSBC: (1) changed its leadership team, including 
its CEO, general counsel, and chief compliance officer;179 (2) clawed back 
bonuses paid to senior officials;180 (3) increased its anti-money laundering 
staff from ninety-two full-time employees and twenty-five consultants to 
880 full-time employees and 267 consultants;181 (4) developed a new 
automated monitoring system to review every wire transaction that goes 
through HSBC USA;182 (5) initiated a company-wide shift to a single 
global anti-money laundering standard;183 (6) tied senior executive 
bonuses to the maintenance of successful compliance standards;184 
(7) separated its legal and compliance departments;185 and (8) required its 
anti-money laundering director to report directly to the board of 
174. DOJ’s HSBC Press Release, supra note 4. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Simon Johnson, “Some of These Institutions Have Become Too Large”, Baseline Scenario 
(Mar. 7, 2013), http://baselinescenario.com/2013/03/07/some-of-these-institutions-have-become-too-large. 
178. Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 11. 
 179. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 165, ¶ 5(a) (“HSBC North America has a 
new leadership team, including a new Chief Executive Officer, General Counsel, Chief Compliance 
Officer, [Anti-Money Laundering] Director, Deputy Chief Compliance Officer and Deputy Director 
of its Global Sanctions program.”). 
180. Id. ¶ 5(b). 
181. Id. ¶ 5(d); id. ¶ 5(c) (“In 2011, HSBC Bank USA spent $244 million on [anti-money 
laundering], approximately nine times more than what it spent in 2009.” (emphasis added)). 
182. Id. ¶ 5(i). 
183. Id. ¶ 5(p) 
184. Id. ¶ 5(v). 
185. Id. ¶ 5(e). 
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directors and senior management regarding its BSA and anti-money 
laundering programs.186 In addition to the billion-dollar fine and 
extensive corporate governance changes, HSBC was also required to 
retain an independent compliance monitor for a five year term, the first 
time in the anti-money laundering context that a financial institution has 
been required to retain an independent compliance monitor.187 
2. Political Backlash in the Wake of HSBC
Despite the record penalties and other punitive features of the HSBC 
DPA, the DOJ’s decision to defer prosecution drew the ire of lawmakers 
on both sides of the political divide.188 One group of bipartisan legislators, 
led by Senator Elizabeth Warren, expressed the populist concern that 
certain financial institutions were “too big for trial,”189 a continuation of 
the dynamic where “[b]ig banks are getting a terrific break, and little 
186. Id. 
 187. See id. ¶¶ 9–13; Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 16. HSBC 
was not the only one of the government’s corporate targets for violations of the BSA. On January 6, 
2014, United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York announced that JP 
Morgan Chase (“JP Morgan”) had entered into a DPA, whereby JP Morgan was charged with two 
felony violations of the BSA in connection with the bank’s failure detect and report suspicious activity 
undertaken by its client, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-in-Charge 
Announce Filing of Criminal Charges Against and Deferred Prosecution Agreement with JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., in Connection with Bernard L. Madoff’s Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme, 
(Jan. 7, 2014) [hereinafter DOJ JP Morgan Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/JPMCDPAPR.php; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 
United States v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank (No. 14 CR-00007-PKC-1) (S.D.N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter JP 
Morgan DPA]. The DPA, which was summarily approved by Judge P. Kevin Castel, required JP 
Morgan to do the following: (1) accept responsibility for its conduct by stipulating to the accuracy of 
an extensive statement of facts; (2) pay a $1.7 billion penalty to the victims of the Madoff fraud 
through a parallel civil forfeiture complaint; (3) refrain from future criminal conduct and cooperate 
fully with the Government; and (4) continue reforms of its BSA/Anti-Money Laundering compliance 
program pursuant to previous undertakings with federal banking regulators. Id. The significance of the 
JP Morgan DPA cannot be understated—JP Morgan became the first U.S. company in recent years to 
enter into a DPA with the DOJ for alleged violations of the BSA. Dan Fitzpatrick, No Penalty for J.P. 
Morgan Officials, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 2014, at C2. In announcing the JP Morgan DPA, United States 
Attorney Preet Bharara stated, “Today, the largest financial institution in the country stands charged 
with two criminal offenses. Institutions, not just individuals, have an obligation to follow the law and 
to police themselves.” See DOJ JP Morgan Press Release, supra. 
188. See, e.g., Letter from Senators Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio) & Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to 
Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. (Jan. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Brown & Grassley Letter], available at 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-grassley-press-justice-department-
on-too-big-to-jail (criticizing the Justice Department for creating the perception that some Wall Street 
banks are too big to jail—a “perception [that] undermines the public’s confidence in our institutions 
and in the principal that the law is applied equally in all cases”). 
 189. Letter from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to Chairman Ben Bernanke, Attorney Gen. 
Eric Holder, & Chairman Mary Jo White (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.warren.senate.gov/ 
documents/LtrtoRegulatorsre2-14-13hrg.pdf. 
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banks are just getting smashed.”190 Pointing to the HSBC case, Senator 
Warren noted: 
If you’re caught with an ounce of cocaine, the chances are good you’re 
gonna go to jail. If it happens repeatedly, you may go to jail for the rest 
of your life . . . . But evidently if you launder nearly a billion dollars for 
drug cartels and violate our international sanctions, your company pays 
a fine and you go home and sleep in your bed at night—every single 
individual associated with this. And I think that’s fundamentally 
wrong.191 
In Senator Warren’s view, the Justice Department should do the same to 
corporations as local prosecutors do to ordinary citizens: “squeez[e] 
[them] on sometimes very thin grounds, and tak[e] them to trial in order 
to make an example.”192 
A second line of criticism, voiced most prominently by Senator 
Charles Grassley, focused more narrowly on whether the Justice 
Department maintained a “too big to jail” policy that delegitimized the 
rule of law and failed to deter corporate misconduct. According to 
Senator Grassley, the “fail[ure] to prosecute individuals or banks when 
they have committed crimes will result in perverse incentives and 
ultimately undermine the integrity of the U.S. financial system and 
economy.”193 Like Senator Warren, Senator Grassley criticized the HSBC 
 190. Mollie Reilly, Elizabeth Warren Takes on Eric Holder’s ‘Too Big to Jail’ Statement, 
Huffington Post (Mar. 7, 2013, 8:09 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/elizabeth-
warren-eric-holder_n_2823618.html. 
 191. Mark Gongloff, Elizabeth Warren: Banks Get Wrist Slaps While Drug Dealers Get Jail, 
Huffington Post (Mar. 7, 2013, 5:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/07/elizabeth-
warren-hsbc-money-laundering_n_2830166.html. 
 192. Cheyenne Hopkins, Elizabeth Warren Decries ‘Too-Big-for-Trial’ Approach to Banks, 
Bloomberg (Feb. 14, 2013, 6:46 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/political-capital/2013-02-14/elizabeth-
warren-decries-too-big-for-trial-approach-to-banks. 
 193. See Letter from Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr. 
(Dec. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Grassley Letter], available at http://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/ 
Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=43551; see also Letter from Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Or.) to 
Attorney Gen. Eric Holder (Dec. 13, 2012), available at http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/ 
press/release/?id=42a606e4-7c45-42ed-8348-c77c508f9281 (expressing his deep concern “that the 
[Justice] Department’s continuing application of deferred prosecution agreements on the grounds of 
financial stability runs contrary to the intent of Congress and undermines the accountability to the rule 
of law that is so fundamental to a healthy, functioning free market economy”). In a later letter to Eric 
Holder, Senator Grassley and Senator Sherrod Brown expressed their joint concern regarding Lanny 
Breuer’s comment that prosecutors have a duty to consult with experts to understand the economic 
impact of bringing criminal charges against a financial institution. The letter: (1) quoted former 
Assistant Attorney General Breuer’s remarks; (2) asked whether his comments meant that the DOJ 
followed a “too big to jail” policy; and (3) questioned its apparent decision not to prosecute 
corporations. See Brown & Grassley Letter, supra note 188. The senators also requested that the 
Justice Department respond to the following questions: 
1. Has the Justice Department designated certain institutions whose failure could jeopardize 
the stability of the financial markets and are thus, “too big to jail”? If so, please name them. 
2. Has the Justice Department ever failed to bring a prosecution against an institution due
to concern that their failure could jeopardize financial markets? 
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DPA as “no more than a parking ticket” that “does little to discourage 
future lawbreakers, and leaves the U.S. financial system highly vulnerable 
to exploitation by drug cartels and terrorists.”194 
Congressional outrage reached a breaking point when, at a March 6, 
2013 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General 
Eric Holder conceded that some institutions are, in fact, too big to 
charge. Attorney General Holder opined that “the size of some of these 
institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult . . . to 
prosecute them when [prosecutors] are hit with indications that if [they] 
do prosecute . . . it will have a negative impact on the national economy, 
perhaps even the world economy.”195  
3. The Justice Department’s Rhetorical Shift
In the wake of the March 6 hearing the DOJ’s rhetoric began to 
shift. On May 15, 2013, in testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Attorney General Holder took a very different stance when 
he stated: “Let me be very, very, very clear . . . . Banks are not too big to 
jail. If we find a bank or a financial institution that has done something 
wrong, if we can prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, those cases will be 
brought.”196  
This position was reinforced a few months later by then-acting 
Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman who, at a House Financial 
Services Committee hearing convened to address the “too big to jail” 
issue, assured the committee that “[n]o institution and no individual is 
3. Are there any entities the Justice Department has entered into settlements with, in which
the amount of the settlement reflected a concern that markets could be impacted by such a 
settlement? If so, for which entities? 
4. Please provide the names of all outside experts consulted by the Justice Department in
making prosecutorial decisions regarding financial institutions with over $1 billion in assets. 
5. Please provide any compensation contracts for these individuals. 
6. How did DOJ ensure that these experts provided unconflicted and unbiased advice to
DOJ? 
194. See Grassley Letter, supra note 193, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 195. Mark Gongloff, Eric Holder Admits Some Banks are Just Too Big to Prosecute, Huffington 
Post (Mar. 6, 2013, 6:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/06/eric-holder-banks-too-
big_n_2821741.html. 
196. Jason M. Breslow, Eric Holder Backtracks Remarks on “Too Big to Jail”, Frontline (May 16, 
2013, 2:15 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-crisis/ 
untouchables/eric-holder-backtracks-remarks-on-too-big-to-jail. 
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immune from prosecution because of its size.”197 That is, “size does not 
equal immunity.”198 
Then, in November 2013, at a money laundering enforcement 
conference, Deputy Attorney General James Cole began his address with 
the “fundamental proposition that no individual or business — including a 
financial institution — is immune from prosecution . . . .” Speaking on 
behalf of the Justice Department, his message was clear: “We are 
committed to holding banks and their employees responsible for their 
misconduct.”199 Thus, while earlier statements may have raised concerns 
regarding the Justice Department’s motives,200 since that time the rhetoric 
from its most senior officials has been clear and consistent: “No 
institution should rest easy in the belief that it is too big to jail.”201  
Despite these assurances, key congressional leaders continued to 
wonder aloud whether large financial institutions were effectively 
permitted to avoid criminal prosecution by paying fines.202 Congressman 
Emanuel Cleaver summarized these concerns in dramatic fashion: 
“[W]hen we hear that none of the Wall Street culprits have gone to trial, 
it contributes to this feeling out here that if you have money, you can get 
off. If you rob a convenience store, you are going to go to jail. If you rob 
the Nation, you just get richer, and you pay a fine.”203 
 197. See generally Who is Too Big to Fail: Are Large Financial Institutions Immune From Federal 
Prosecution? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Who is Too Big To Fail? Hearing]; see also Sarah N. Lynch, 
Justice Department Tells Lawmakers No Bank is Too Big to Jail, Reuters (May 22, 2013, 6:55 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-banks-jail-idUSBRE94L1AM20130522. 
 198. Raman also stressed that under the Justice Department’s corporate charging guidelines, 
collateral consequences are but one factor that prosecutors are directed to consider. See Lynch, supra 
note 197; see also Evan Weinberger, Top Justice Official Says No Bank Too Big to Jail, Law360 
(May 22, 2013, 6:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/443957/top-justice-official-says-no-bank-too-
big-to-jail. 
 199. James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., Remarks at Money Laundering Enforcement 
Conference in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 18, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/ 
opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131118.html. 
200. See supra notes 155–158, 175–177, 195 and accompanying text. 
 201. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-in-
Charge Announce Insider Trading Charges Against Four SAC Capital Management Companies and SAC 
Portfolio Manager (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/ 
SACPR.php [hereinafter DOJ SAC Press Release]; see also Jenny Strasburg & Michael Rothfeld, U.S. 
Readies SAC Charges—Criminal Case Against Hedge-Fund Firm Would Follow Multiyear Insider Probe, 
Wall St. J., July 23, 2013, at A1 (quoting Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District 
of New York); Patricia Hurtado, JP Morgan-Madoff Case Won’t Be the Last Big One, Bharara Says, 
Bloomberg (Jan. 28, 2014, 7:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-27/jpm-case-tied-to-
madoff-not-the-last-big-case-bharara-says.html (“JPMorgan is not going to be the last big case that my 
office brings in this area, I can promise that.” (quoting Preet Bahara, United States Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York)). 
202. See id. (summarizing legislators’ concerns). 
203. See Who is Too Big to Fail? Hearing, supra note 197, at 9. In an extreme expression of 
dissatisfaction with the HSBC settlement, in October 2013 Congresswoman Maxine Waters, the top 
Democrat on the House Financial Services Committee, introduced a bill entitled the “Holding 
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IV. The “Too Big to Jail” Effect
The intense political scrutiny that culminated with the HSBC case 
provides the backdrop for a phenomenon we call the “too big to jail” 
effect. Specifically, two significant developments have taken place within 
the government in the wake of the HSBC DPA, each of which could 
substantially impact the DOJ’s approach to corporate criminality. 
A. Judge Gleeson’s Opinion in UNITED STATES V. HSBC 
The first is Judge Gleeson’s opinion in the HSBC case.204 On 
December 20, 2012, eight days after the HSBC DPA was filed, Judge 
Gleeson, the district judge to whom the case had been assigned, called the 
parties in for a status conference. The purpose of the conference was not 
to announce his approval of the DPA, but to ask the parties to address the 
scope of a district court’s review of such an agreement. Specifically, Judge 
Gleeson questioned whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Fed. 
R. Crim. P.”) 11(c)(1)(A) and U.S. Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) 
§ 6B1.2 governed, thereby permitting him to reject the DPA if he found
that it did not “adequately reflect[] the seriousness of the defendants’ 
offense behavior.”205 Judge Gleeson’s query was remarkable because no 
court had ever considered this question before. Prior to this time, the 
Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act.” Rachel Louise Ensign & Michael R. 
Crittenden, New Anti-Money Laundering Bill Targets Bank Executives, Wall St. J. Risk & 
Compliance J. (Oct. 23, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/10/23/new-anti-
money-laundering-bill-targets-bank-executives. Among other things, the bill includes a requirement 
that the DOJ explain to Congress “‘why it did or did not pursue prison sentences’ when it settles an 
anti-money laundering probe for a financial penalty.” Id. 
 204. See, e.g., Savarese et al., supra note 27, at 907 (“Judge Gleeson’s opinion in HSBC is the first 
carefully considered judicial ruling establishing the basis for a court’s authority to review and approve 
a proposed DPA.”). Before the “too big to jail” effect, both the government and corporate defendants 
were right to assume that the court’s approval of a DPA was a mere formality. See Gillison, supra note 
45 (providing a chart that illustrates that in the last four years, Judge Gleeson is the only district judge 
to have spent more than two days reviewing the terms of a DPA involving a large bank). Even the 
great weight of scholarly literature described the prospect of judicial review of a DPA as a 
“pipedream.” F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A View from 
the Trenches and a Proposal for Reform, 93 Va. L. Rev. Brief 121, 122 (2007). Judge Gleeson’s 
opinion was thus extraordinary by any measure. See Savarese, supra note 27, at 907 (describing 
Gleeson’s opinion as both novel and important). 
 205. Transcript of Status Conference at 6, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., (No. 12-0763) 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012). Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A) contemplates that the DOJ and a defendant can reach a 
charge bargain providing that if the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or 
a lesser related offense, “the plea agreement may specify that an attorney for the government will . . . 
not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 is 
triggered by such a plea bargain. HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum at 2, United States v. HSBC Bank 
USA (No. 12-0763) (E.D.N.Y. 2013) [hereinafter HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum]. It provides that the 
district court may accept a charge bargain provided “the court determines, for reasons stated on the 
record, that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior 
and that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the 
sentencing guidelines.” 18 U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2. 
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uniformly-held view had been that only the Speedy Trial Act governed a 
district court’s review of a DPA.206 
While at the hearing the Justice Department and HSBC expressed 
initial agreement with Judge Gleeson’s position,207 their subsequent 
written submissions presented a much different picture.208 In their 
submissions, both parties argued that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A) and 
U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 were inapposite since HSBC had not agreed to plead 
guilty or nolo contendere, and the DOJ had not agreed to dismiss other 
charges in exchange for HSBC’s guilty plea.209 The DOJ and HSBC 
contended instead that section 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act applied, 
and that subsection (h)(2) “provides the applicable legal standard for the 
Court’s review, as it requires the Court’s approval for the exclusion of 
time.”210 HSBC further asserted that because “subsection (h)(2) does not 
itself set forth a standard for the exclusion of time in the deferred 
prosecution context,” subsection (h)(7), the Act’s catch-all provision, 
controlled.211 The scope of the court’s review was therefore limited to 
 206. See, e.g., Zierdt & Podgor, supra note 46, at 14 (noting that DPAs are presented to a federal 
court only to satisfy the Speedy Trial Act, which “exempts the deferral of criminal matters from the 
speedy trial constraints”); Gibson 2013 Mid-year Update, supra note 76, at 9 (noting that the role of 
courts in the DPA context traditionally has been limited to “approval of time exclusions under the 
Speedy Trial Act for the length of deferral periods and dismissal of charges following successful 
completion of those periods”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-10-110, Corporate Crime: 
DOJ Has Taken Steps to Better Track Its Use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, 
But Should Evaluate Effectiveness 25 (2009) (“The Speedy Trial Act allows judges to approve the 
deferral of prosecution pursuant to a written agreement between the government and the defendant, 
for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate its good conduct; however, the law does not 
otherwise specify judicial involvement in the DPA process.”). 
207. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A).  
 208. See Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 2 n.1 (noting that while 
“the government did not object to the Court’s characterization of the DPA as falling within the 
parameters of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) . . . a subsequent, more careful review 
of the rule and the law” shows that “the DPA does not fall within that rule” (emphasis added)); 
HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 205, at 2 (noting that Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11(c)(1) is “limited by its terms to cases where the defendant pleads guilty or nolo 
contendere” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
209. See Gov’t Memorandum Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 2 n.1; HSBC’s Pretrial 
Memorandum, supra note 208, at 2. 
 210. See Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 2; see also HSBC’s 
Pretrial Memorandum at 2. Pursuant to section (h)(2), “[a]ny period of delay during which the 
prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to written agreement with the 
defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate 
his good conduct shall be excluded . . . in computing time within which the trial of any such case must 
commence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3616(h)(2).  
 211. See HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 205, at 2 (“While subsection (h)(2) does not 
itself set forth a standard for the exclusion of time in the deferred prosecution context, subsection (h)(7), 
the Act’s catch-all provision, provides that time should be excluded if the interests of justice served by the 
exclusion outweigh the best interests of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial.”). 
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whether the DPA was in “the best interests of the defendant and the 
public in a speedy trial.”212 
Seizing on this proposed standard, the DOJ and HSBC laid out in 
great detail why, in their respective views, Judge Gleeson should accept 
the proposed DPA. The government’s submission emphasized two 
points: (1) HSBC had implemented substantial reforms voluntarily and 
“long before any charging decisions were made;”213 and (2) the 
$1.256 billion forfeiture amount imposed against HSBC was the largest 
ever,214 and was not tied to the amount of money that circulated through 
HSBC—as was the alleged money laundering activity.215 
For its part, HSBC focused on that fact that the old guard had been 
relieved of its duties, and an entirely new U.S. senior management had 
been appointed.216 HSBC noted that the bank had invested $290 million 
in remediating its anti-money laundering program, which included the 
hiring of important figures from the Treasury Department.217 HSBC 
further highlighted the extent of its past cooperation and promise to 
assist the government’s ongoing investigation of the case.218 
Despite the sensitive nature of the HSBC DPA and the potential 
damage that a rejection could cause, Judge Gleeson did not immediately 
approve. Indeed, he delayed expressing his approval for almost seven 
months.219 The delay allowed a number of concerned citizens, including a 
former HSBC employee, to submit letters seeking to persuade Judge 
Gleeson to reject the DPA.220 It also fueled speculation among 
commentators that he would do just that.221 
212. See id. 
 213. Gov’t Memorandum in Support of HSBC DPA, supra note 166, at 11–12. These reforms, the 
agency contended, eliminated the institution-wide absence of accountability that permeated the firm. 
See id. at 12–14. 
214. See id. at 17. 
215. See id. (“The forfeiture . . . is based on the amount of drug trafficking proceeds and 
sanctioned entity transactions that moved through HSBC, and not the revenue that HSBC earned 
from the transactions.”); cf. Transcript of Hearing on the Joint Motion for Approval of DPA 6:12–21, 
United States v. Barclays Bank PLC (No. 10-0218) (D.D.C. 2010) (criticizing the government for 
requiring Barclays to pay back only what it illegally obtained). 
216. See HSBC’s Pretrial Memorandum, supra note 205, at 2–3. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. at 4–5. Alternatively, HSBC argued that under the Due Process Clause, it is “plainly 
entitled to its essential contractual right—the deferral of prosecution—because it gave up substantial 
rights in reliance on the Agreement.” Id. at 5. 
 219. The parties filed the DPA on December 12, 2012. Judge Gleeson did not extend his approval 
of the DPA until July 1, 2013. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 
3306161 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2013) 
 220. See Letter from Liviu Vogel to Judge John Gleeson (May 2, 2013) (on file with Author) 
(requesting that the court consider whether the approval of the proposed non-prosecution agreement 
should be conditioned upon HSBC’s payment of some portion of the criminal forfeiture to thousands of 
victims of Iranian terrorism); Letter from Berenice Mosca to Judge John Gleeson (on file with Author) 
(urging Judge Gleeson to “not approve this grossly inadequate settlement offer”); Letter from Robert 
Warner to Judge John Gleeson (Mar. 18, 2013) (on file with Authors) (“Acceptance of this terrible 
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Judge Gleeson finally expressed his approval of the HSBC DPA on 
July 1, 2013.222 He did so, importantly, in a detailed twenty-page opinion 
that bore no resemblance to the formulaic orders that had been standard 
fare in the DPA context.223 Contrary to the assertions of the DOJ and 
HSBC, Judge Gleeson determined that the Speedy Trial Act does not 
govern a district court’s review of a DPA. Judge Gleeson opined that the 
“ends-of-justice” balancing test in section 3161(h)(7) applies only in the 
narrow context where the parties seek a continuance because the “the 
ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s 
and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.”224 But where, as here, the 
parties sought to “exclude the delay occasioned by a deferred prosecution 
agreement,”225 the operative provision is section 3161(h)(2), which 
provides that delay is excluded by a deferred prosecution upon acceptance 
by the district court.226 The problem, Judge Gleeson observed, is that 
section 3161(h)(2) “is silent as to the standard the court should employ 
when evaluating whether to grant ‘approval’ to a deferred prosecution 
agreement”—a question that is distinct from the whether the court should 
“approv[e] the exclusion of delay during the deferral of prosecution.”227 
The latter question triggers only upon approval of the DPA.228 
agreement would permit our government to escape its responsibility and set a dangerous precedent for 
American justice.”); Letter from Anonymous Individual to Judge Gleeson (on file with Authors) 
(detailing compliance issues at HSBC); Letter from Marie Kerr to Judge John Gleeson (May 24, 2013) 
(on file with Authors) (offering her assistance to help remediate HSBC’s compliance issues). 
 221. See, e.g., Matthew Mosk, Will Judge Go Rogue, Reject DOJ Settlement With Big Bank?, ABC 
News (Mar. 13, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/hsbc-judge-rogue-reject-doj-settlement-big-
bank/story?id=18717423 (quoting Sam Buell, who opined that “[i]t does not seem likely that the judge 
would have taken this much time if he was not at least thinking hard about whether to accept the 
agreement”). 
222. See HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *1. 
 223. See, e.g., Steven E. Fagell et al., The HSBC DPA—Approved, But at What Cost?, Law360 
(July 8, 2013, 3:09 PM), http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/a5ced455-cc43-40f1-80ff-52485645fabb/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/dcd98c07-67f7-4fbc-9201-58e51da1c475/ 
The_HSBC_DPA_Approved_But_At_What_Cost.pdf (observing that “Judge Gleeson’s opinion will 
likely increase the pressure on both companies and the Justice Department to consider carefully whether 
the provisions of a DPA are likely to withstand judicial scrutiny”). Judge Gleeson’s opinion was strikingly 
similar to Judge Jed Rakoff’s decision in S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). See infra note 246; see also Anthony S. Barkow & Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased 
Judicial Scrutiny of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2013, at 1, available at 
http://jenner.com/system/assets/publications/12185/original/NYLJ_Barkow_Cipolla_082013.pdf?13771
17135 (observing that Judge Rakoff’s scrutiny of the Citigroup consent decree provided the backdrop 
for Judge Gleeson’s decision in HSBC). 
224. HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3. 
225. Id. (emphasis added). 
226. See id. (explaining that the “DPA at issue here is, without a doubt, about diverting HSBC 
from criminal prosecution,” thus triggering the application of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2)). 
227. Id. 
 228. See id. (“[T]he question of whether to exclude the duration of the DPA from the speedy trial 
clock hinges on a determination of whether the Court approves the DPA.”). 
June 2014]  TOO BIG TO JAIL 1329 
To fill the void, Judge Gleeson turned to the federal court’s 
supervisory power, which “permits federal courts to supervise the 
administration of criminal justice among the parties before the bar”229 and 
“protect[s] the integrity of judicial proceedings.”230 He opined that, by 
entering into a DPA, the parties had chosen to implicate the Court in their 
resolution of the matter, and by doing so “the parties [had] subjected their 
DPA to the legitimate exercise of that court’s authority.”231 Judge Gleeson 
conceded, however, that the invocation of a court’s supervisory power in 
the context of a deferred prosecution would be atypical, and the scope of 
the power unexplored.232 The more typical case is where “the defendant 
raises a purported impropriety in the federal criminal proceeding and 
seeks the court’s redress of that impropriety”233—an unlikely scenario in 
the deferral context “given the risk of derailing the deferral.”234 That said, 
Judge Gleeson cataloged a few instances where a court would be well 
within its supervisory power to intervene.235 
In the end, Judge Gleeson approved the HSBC DPA, finding no 
impropriety that “implicates the integrity of the Court.”236 While he 
acknowledged the “heavy public criticism” of the DPA,237 as well as the 
“unsolicited input from members of the public urging [him] to reject the 
DPA,” he stressed that the decision to hold HSBC criminally liable is 
squarely in the government’s hands, not his.238 Judge Gleeson reasoned 
that “[t]he Executive Branch alone is vested with the power to decide 
229. Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n.7 (1980). 
 230. Id. In 1997, Judge Gleeson published a law review article examining the scope of the supervisory 
power. See generally Hon. John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the 
Supervisory Power of Federal Judges, 5 J.L. & Pol’y 423 (1997). The article advocated that despite 
pressure on district judges to rein in the all-powerful prosecutor, judges should resist the temptation to 
supervise them. Id. at 428. This is because, in Judge Gleeson’s view, judges are not “well-suited to 
supervise criminal investigations, a process which is generally best left to the executive branch.” Id. 




235. They include: (1) where the DPA requires cooperation of such nature that it may violate a 
company’s attorney-client privilege or work produce protection or its employees’ constitutional rights; 
(2) where the remedial actions prosecutors require the defendant to take have no nexus to the alleged 
criminal wrongdoing; and (3) where an independent monitor is selected based solely on his or her 
relationship to the prosecutor. See id. 
236. Id. at *7. 
 237. Id. (citing Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 2012, at A38; Jesse Singal, HSBC 
Report Should Result in Prosecutions, Not Just Fines, Say Critics, Daily Beast (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/18/hsbc-report-should-result-in-prosecutions-not-just-
fines-say-critics.html; Matt Taibbi, Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail, Rolling Stone (Feb. 14, 2013, 
8:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/gangster-bankers-too-big-to-jail-20130214.  
238. HSBC Bank USA, 2013 WL 3306161, at *7. Judge Gleeson also acknowledged that “if the 
government moved under [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 48(a) to dismiss the Information, it would be an abuse of 
discretion not to grant that motion.” Id. 
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whether or not to prosecute,”239 and that judges must be “mindful that 
they have no business exercising [prosecutorial] discretion and, as an 
institutional matter, are not equipped to do so.”240 
Nevertheless, Judge Gleeson examined the DPA provision-by-
provision, noting the extent to which it requires HSBC to implement 
remedial measures that address its systemic compliance failures.241 He also 
highlighted the substantial amount that HSBC is required to forfeit and 
the fact that it must admit criminal wrongdoing.242 Given these facts, and 
the broad deference the judicial branch owes to the executive branch, 
Judge Gleeson “approve[d] without hesitation both the DPA and the 
manner in which it has been implemented thus far.”243 In a move equally 
novel to his invocation of the federal courts’ supervisory power, however, 
he maintained that so long as the criminal case remains on his docket, the 
“implementation of the DPA [must] remain[] within the bounds of 
lawfulness and respect[] the integrity of this Court.”244 To this end, he 
required the parties to submit “quarterly reports with the Court to keep 
it apprised of all significant developments in the implementation of the 
DPA.”245 
Judge Gleeson’s ruling on the HSBC DPA is a radical departure 
from past judicial practice. Rather than rubber-stamp the DOJ’s decision 
to defer prosecution, he introduced a new standard for district courts to 
apply in their review of a DPA’s content.246 But by his own admission, the 
239. Id. (citation omitted). 
240. Id. at *8. 
241. See id. at *10. 
242. Id. at *11 (“Indeed, taking into account the fact that a company cannot be imprisoned, it 
appears to me that much of what might have been accomplished by a criminal conviction has been 
agreed to in the DPA.”). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. The inspiration for this requirement appears to come from the Accountability in Deferred 
Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. § 7, which never made it out of committee. The bill 
provided that each party to a DPA as well as any independent monitor required under the DPA to 
“submit to the court in which the agreement is filed quarterly reports on the progress made toward the 
completion of the agreement, and describing any concern the filer has about the implementation of the 
agreement.” Id. § 7(b). For a more detailed discussion of the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution 
Act, see infra notes 319–322 and accompanying text. 
 246. Judge Gleeson is not alone in the refusal to sign off on a privately negotiated agreement 
between the federal government and a big bank. He is just one among a growing group of federal 
judges who have recently expressed a willingness to insert themselves into the process of reviewing 
settlements with the government. The indisputable leader of this group is Judge Jed Rakoff, who in 
December 2011 declined to approve a settlement reached between the SEC and Citigroup Global 
Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”), arising from Citigroup’s role in causing the collapse of the market for 
mortgage-backed securities. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). In Judge Rakoff’s view, as expressed in the opinion in Citigroup, a rubber-stamping judiciary “is 
worse than mindless, it is inherently dangerous.” Id. at 335. For a more detailed discussion of Judge 
Rakoff’s opinion in Citigroup, see generally Edward Wyatt, Judge Blocks Citigroup Settlement with 
S.E.C., N.Y. Times (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/business/judge-rejects-sec-
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standard itself is so stringent that it is not likely to disturb any but the most 
outrageous agreements. His opinion is nevertheless extraordinary in that it 
opens the door for substantive judicial intervention in the deferral process. 
Notably, one additional federal judge delayed approval pending a 
review of the terms of a corporate DPA during the same time frame, albeit 
without attempting to articulate an applicable legal standard.247 It remains 
to be seen whether, going forward, district judges will provide the same 
level of scrutiny or accord the same degree of deference to the Justice 
Department.248 Because the law governing judicial review of DPAs is 
largely unwritten, the answer is as of yet unclear. 
B. The LIBOR, SAC Capital, and Credit Suisse Cases: The DOJ’s 
Recent Return to Criminal Prosecutions of Financial 
Institutions 
While the “too big to jail” effect contemplates an open door to 
meaningful judicial participation in the deferral process, it also translates 
into a second significant development: a re-examination by the Justice 
Department of its decade-long reliance on DPAs in the corporate 
criminal context. Simply put, in the wake of the HSBC case, the DOJ 
appears to have taken the intense congressional scrutiny of its charging 
practices to heart, and in several recent cases federal prosecutors have 
shown a willingness to embrace criminal charges as a means of 
addressing corporate misconduct. 
1. The LIBOR Prosecutions: The New Middle Ground?
At the same time as federal prosecutors were investigating HSBC, 
wrongdoing of a different sort landed in the Justice Department’s lap. 
accord-with-citi.html. Notably, the Second Circuit cast serious doubt on Judge Rakoff’s decision, finding 
“no indication in the record that the court gave deference to the S.E.C.’s judgment” that the settlement 
was in the public interest. See SEC v. Citigroup Capital Mkts., 673 F.3d 158, 164 (2d. Cir. 2012). 
 247. In United States v. Wakemed, Judge Terrance Boyle twice delayed approval of a DPA 
resolving an investigation into fraudulent Medicare billing practices by Wakemed. See Transcript of 
Docket Call, United States v. Wakemed, No. 5:12-0398 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 17, 2013); Transcript of 
Disposition Hearing and Arraignment, United States v. Wakemed, No. 5:12-0398 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 
2013); see also Anthony S. Barkow and Matthew D. Cipolla, Increased Judicial Scrutiny of Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 2013, at 2, available at http://jenner.com/system/assets/ 
publications/12185/original/NYLJ_Barkow_Cipolla_082013.pdf?1377117135. Boyle initially refused to 
approve the DPA based on concerns about the extent of the wrongdoing, a perceived lack of 
protection for privately insured patients who may have been improperly billed, and the absence of 
charges against senior level managers. Id. He eventually approved the DPA after determining that it 
was in the public interest. United States v. Wakemed, No. 5:12-0398, 2013 WL 501784, at *2 (E.D.N.C. 
Feb. 8, 2013). In particular, Judge Boyle reasoned that a prosecution would harm the public because it 
would bar Wakemed from participating as a Medicare and Medicaid provider, thus impeding patients’ 
access to these services. Id. Unlike Judge Gleeson, however, Judge Boyle did not seek to supply a 
standard of review beyond “consider[ing] the equities at issue.” Id. 
248. Fagell et al., supra note 223. 
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Beginning in the spring of 2009, bank regulators were alerted to a 
financial scandal orchestrated by some of the biggest banks in the world 
involving LIBOR rates, the reference point for over $350 trillion in 
financial products.249 At the simplest level, the allegations were that 
bankers and brokers employed at the banks used to set LIBOR colluded 
to boost profits from their in-house trading positions.250 The banks 
involved in this alleged scandal included Barclays, Citigroup, JP Morgan 
Chase, RBS, and UBS, among others.251 
Consistent with past practice, the DOJ entered into settlement 
discussions with the targets of its investigation.252 Barclays was the first to 
cooperate, and for its effort was offered an NPA, under which it would 
have to pay a $160 million penalty.253 Several months later, on 
December 19, 2012, UBS entered into an NPA of its own, under which it 
agreed to pay a fine of $400 million.254 The DOJ then entered into a DPA 
 249. See Christine A. Edwards et al., Implications for Commercial Organizations of the Global 
Investigations into LIBOR, 129 Banking L.J. 831, 831 (2012) (stating that LIBOR is the benchmark 
interest rate at which banks lend to one another, and that the products tied to it include domestic 
mortgages, swaps, and futures); see also Shahien Nasiripour, Effect of Libor on US Loans Examined, 
Fin. Times (July 11, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1b2d25aa-cb66-11e1-911e-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz20Q1kN0xj (noting that at least 900,000 outstanding home loans indexed to 
LIBOR originated during the time the rate was allegedly rigged—from 2005 to 2009). 
 250. The LIBOR rate is a calculation that is based upon submissions from a panel of banks 
selected by the British Bankers’ Association (“BBA”). See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between the 
U.S. Department of Justice and UBS AG App’x A at 1 (Dec. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/1392012121911745845757.pdf. The BBA defines LIBOR as 
“[t]he rate at which an individual Contributor Panel bank could borrow funds, were it to do so by 
asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in reasonable market size, just prior to 11:00 [a.m.] 
London Time.” Id. In connection with the rate-rigging scheme, traders at the banks implicated in the 
scheme coordinated with each other to make submissions that “would benefit the traders’ trading 
positions, rather than rates that complied with the definitions of LIBOR.” Id. at 8. 
 251. See Shahien Nasiripour, Nine More Banks Added to Libor Probe, Fin. Times (Oct. 26, 2012, 
4:59 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f4e7960-1f1a-11e2-be82-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2dO4UORJO. 
252. Patrick Jenkins & Brooke Masters, Banks Pushed for Next Libor Settlement, Fin. Times 
(Oct. 28, 2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa28764c-1f85-11e2-b273-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz32DD5jxYs. 
 253. See Liam Vaughan et al., Diamond Pays Penalty for Being First Mover in Libor Probe, 
Bloomberg (July 4, 2012, 1:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-03/diamond-pays-
penalty-for-being-first-mover-in-libor-probe.html (noting that “Barclays was the first bank to 
cooperate ‘in a meaningful way’” with the Justice Department); see also Press Release, Dep’t of 
Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank 
Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html (describing allegations 
and penalties imposed). 
 254. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty to Felony Wire 
Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Benchmark Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter 
UBS Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-1522.html. 
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with RBS on February 6, 2013, requiring RBS to, among other things, 
pay $150 million.255 
In an extreme departure from past practice, however, the DOJ 
followed the settlements with UBS and RBS by filing criminal charges 
against the Japanese subsidiaries of those banks for their roles in the 
LIBOR-rigging scheme.256 On December 19, 2012, and February 6, 2013, 
the same days the DOJ disclosed its respective settlements with the 
parent companies, it announced that it had secured guilty pleas from 
UBS Securities Japan Co., Ltd. (“UBS Japan”) and RBS Securities 
Japan Limited (“RBS Japan”), respectively, for coordinating with one 
another to manipulate LIBOR rates in their favor.257 UBS Japan agreed 
to pay a $100 million fine in connection with its guilty plea;258 RBS Japan 
agreed to pay $50 million.259 Then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer 
heralded the pleas as “extraordinary results” involving “significant 
financial institutions.”260 “Our message is clear,” he added, “no financial 
institution is above the law.”261 
The UBS Japan and RBS Japan guilty pleas are landmark 
developments.262 Not since Drexel Burnham more than twenty years prior 
had the Justice Department filed criminal charges against an arm of a 
major a financial institution.263 Some commentators speculated that the 
DOJ used the UBS Japan and RBS Japan prosecutions as test cases for a 
new model of corporate criminal prosecutions.264 The UBS and RBS 
 255. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement ¶ 7, United States v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, 
(No. 3:13-CR-74-MPS) (D. Conn. 2013). 
 256. See generally Plea Agreement, United States v. UBS Secs. Japan Co., Ltd. (No. 3:12-cr-00268-
RNC) (D. Conn. 2012), [hereinafter UBS Plea Agreement]; Plea Agreement, United States v. RBS 
Secs. Japan Ltd. (No. 3:13-CR-73-MPS) (D. Conn. 2013) [hereinafter RBS Plea Agreement]. Some 
commentators have opined that this strategy of settling criminal charges with the parent company 
while securing a guilty plea from one of its subsidiaries is not entirely new for the Justice Department. 
See Garcia et al., supra note 96 (observing that the Justice Department has pursued this “middle” 
strategy in a few FCPA enforcement actions). 
 257. See UBS Press Release, supra note 254; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, RBS Securities Japan 
Limited Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of Libor Benchmark 
Interest Rates (Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter RBS Press Release], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-crm-161.html. 
258. See UBS Plea Agreement, supra note 256, ¶ 15. 
259. See RBS Plea Agreement, supra note 256, ¶ 15. 
260. RBS Press Release, supra note 257. 
261. Id. 
262. See Peter J. Henning, UBS Settlement Minimizes Impact of Guilty Plea, N.Y. Times DealBook 
(Dec. 20, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ubs-settlement-minimizes-impact-of-
guilty-plea (“[T]he guilty plea by the UBS subsidiary is the first time an arm of [a] major financial 
institution has been convicted of a crime since Drexel Burnham was more than 20 years ago.”). 
263. Id. 
 264. See Richard Levick, The LIBOR Scandal: Prosecutors Have a New Plan, Forbes (Feb. 28, 2013, 
7:22 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick/2013/02/28/the-libor-scandal-prosecutors-have-a-
new-plan (“While LIBOR-type cases have been the focus so far, there are expectations that a successful 
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subsidiaries reportedly had “few ties to American arms of the banks, 
containing any threat to the [U.S.] economy.”265 By focusing charges on 
non-U.S. subsidiaries, therefore, the DOJ could “shield the parent 
company from losing its license, but still send a warning to the financial 
industry.”266 This middle-ground approach reduced the risk of an 
Andersen-style collapse while still capturing the expressive function of a 
criminal conviction.267 As then-Assistant Attorney General Breuer made 
clear, the goal was “not to destroy a major financial institution,”268 but to 
send a strong message that criminal wrongdoing would be dealt with a 
heavy hand. 
In any event, the UBS Japan and RBS Japan prosecutions were the 
first signal that the Justice Department’s approach to corporate criminal 
prosecutions was evolving, and that for the first time in many years, 
criminal charges against a high-profile financial institution were back on 
the table.269 
2. SAC Capital Advisors: Controlled Criminal Prosecution
To the extent that the UBS Japan and RBS Japan cases reflect the 
Justice Department’s willingness to pursue a middle-ground approach to 
corporate criminal prosecutions, the indictment of SAC Capital Advisors 
demonstrated that the DOJ was prepared to go all the way as well.270 
On July 25, 2013, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York announced the indictment of SAC Capital and 
three affiliates—investment managers responsible for managing the 
portfolio of a group of affiliated hedge funds—for engaging in a 
“[d]ecade-[l]ong [i]nsider [t]rading [s]cheme on a [s]cale [w]ithout 
[k]nown [p]recedent in the [h]edge [f]und [i]ndustry.”271 The indictment, 
beta test involving purported rate manipulation by UBS and Royal Bank of Scotland—as well as ongoing 
inquiries regarding Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase—will lead to broader application in the future.”). 
 265. Ben Protess, Prosecutors, Shifting Strategy, Build New Wall Street Cases, N.Y. Times 
DealBook (Feb. 18, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/prosecutors-build-a-
better-strategy-to-go-after-wall-street. In addition, in both instances, DOJ officials reportedly received 
assurance from Japanese regulators that a corporate conviction would not amount to a loss of license. 
See Levick, supra note 264 (“The fact that a Japanese regulator reassured UBS ahead of time that its 
subsidiary would not lose its license is widely cited as an example of the essential frailty of this new 
regime.”). 
266. Garcia et al., supra note 96. 
267. See id. 
268. Jim Puzzanghera, U.S. Says UBS Was Motivated by “Sheer Greed” in Libor Rigging, L.A. 
Times (Dec. 19, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/19/business/la-fi-mo-ubs-libor-fine-justice-
20121219. 
 269. See Garcia et al., supra note 96 (“[I]f the UBS and RBS subsidiaries weather prosecution 
without significant harm, the DOJ may well pursue this approach on a wider scale.”). 
 270. See id. (describing the Justice Department’s deferred prosecution of the parent entity while 
securing guilty pleas from a subsidiary as a “middle way” approach). 
 271. See DOJ SAC Press Release, supra note 201; see also Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. 
Capital Advisors, L.P. (No. 13 Crim. 541) (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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the product of an extensive investigation of the venerable firm,272 alleged 
that from 1999 through at least 2010, numerous SAC Capital portfolio 
managers and research analysts obtained and traded on material, non-
public information, or recommended trades based on such information to 
SAC Capital’s owner, Steven Cohen.273 The “systematic insider trading” 
that took place was allegedly “the predictable and foreseeable result” of an 
institutional failure at SAC Capital, namely a business culture that 
encouraged the “relentless pursuit of an information ‘edge’” with “no 
meaningful commitment to ensuring that such ‘edge’ came from legitimate 
research and not Inside Information.”274 The scheme purportedly netted 
SAC Capital and Cohen “hundreds of millions of dollars” in profits.275 
Despite the indictment, there remained the possibility that 
prosecutors and SAC Capital would enter into a DPA, allowing SAC 
Capital to escape without the stain of a criminal conviction. In a departure 
from post-Andersen practice, however, prosecutors instead demanded a 
guilty plea.276 In November 2013, SAC Capital pleaded guilty to four 
counts of insider trading and one count of wire fraud.277 The firm also 
agreed to both pay $1.8 billion in penalties—a record sum278—and 
terminate its investment advisory business, thus closing the fund to 
outside investors.279  
272. See DOJ SAC Press Release, supra note 201. 
 273. See id. ¶ 4. At the time of the indictment, SAC Capital had close to $14 billion under 
management; a little more than half of which came directly from Steven Cohen. See Gretchen 
Morgenson, How to Gauge SAC on the Richter Scale, N.Y. Times (July 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/business/how-to-gauge-sac-on-the-richter-scale.html (discussing 
various factors regarding whether S.A.C. Capital will be able to survive the indictment). 
274. See Sealed Indictment, supra note 271, ¶ 7. As charged in the indictment, the institutional 
failure manifested in three ways: (1) a focus on recruiting portfolio managers and analysts who had 
proven networks of public company contacts, with little corresponding effort to ensure that such 
contacts were not exploited to obtain inside information; (2) a system of providing financial rewards to 
employees for recommending to SAC Capital’s principal “high conviction” trading ideas that had an 
“edge” over other investors; and (3) limited compliance measures designed to detect or prevent 
insider trading. See David Deitch, The Problems with the SAC Capital Indictment, Law360 (July 26, 
2013, 12:14 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/460326/the-problems-with-the-sac-capital-indictment; 
see also DOJ SAC Press Release, supra note 201; Sealed Indictment, supra note 271, ¶ 11. 
275. See Sealed Indictment, supra note 271, ¶ 7. 
 276. See Michael Rothfeld, SAC Will Plead Guilty to Insider-Trading—Hedge-Fund Firm to Pay 
Biggest Fine in U.S.’s Prosecution of Financial Crimes, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 2013, at C1 (describing the 
SAC Capital prosecution as “a turning point for criminal prosecution of corporations”). 
277. See Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P. (No. 13 Cr. 541 
(LTS)) (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 278. See id. at 2; see also DOJ’s SAC Capital Press Release, supra note 19 (describing the penalty 
imposed as “the largest insider trading penalty in history”). The $1.8 billion penalty consisted of a 
$900 million in connection with the criminal case and the forfeiture of $900 million in connection with 
the settlement of the civil forfeiture action filed against SAC Capital. Id. 
 279. See Plea Agreement, supra note 277, at 2. Critics contend that the charges against SAC 
Capital were an inappropriate proxy for the government’s inability to marshal sufficient evidence 
against Cohen himself. See Deitch, supra note 274 (observing that because the prosecutors were 
unable to collect sufficient evidence to prosecute Cohen, it “is obvious . . . that the government’s 
1336 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1293 
The charges against SAC Capital represented an even more 
significant deviation from the norm than the LIBOR cases discussed 
above. Rather than extracting guilty pleas from foreign subsidiaries as 
part of a negotiated settlement, as it did with UBS and RBS, the DOJ 
indicted and obtained the criminal conviction of a well-known U.S. 
investment advisory firm.280 This marked the first occasion when the 
government resorted to such an extreme tactic in the corporate criminal 
context since the Arthur Andersen case more than ten years ago.281 It was 
thus a bold step by any measure.282 
decision to indict the SAC Companies is a proxy for charges against Cohen”); Katherine Rautenberg, 
Attorneys React to SAC Capital Indictment, Law360 (July 25, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/460233/attorneys-react-to-sac-capital-indictment (quoting Glen Donath, who opined that 
“[t]he government rarely decides to charge a company and not its owner or CEO”). That is, the Justice 
Department’s fallback strategy should not have been to destroy Cohen’s firm because the evidence 
against him was weak. See Deitch, supra note 274 (“Having failed to develop evidence to support a 
criminal case to send Steven Cohen to prison, the government is instead seeking to destroy the 
company he has built.”); Rautenberg, supra (“It is remarkable that federal prosecutors would indict 
SAC without enough evidence to bring serious charges against Steven Cohen . . . . This indictment will 
effectively sink SAC, devastating the lives and investment portfolios of countless innocent 
individuals.”); id. (“Given the somewhat unique circumstances of this case and its very high public 
profile, this decision to indict the company . . . . should be seen more as an effort to save face after the 
[government’s] inability to develop the evidence necessary to indict Mr. Cohen despite years of 
sustained efforts to do so.”). Others suggest that there is nothing improper about the government’s 
case against SAC Capital, as it is a relatively straightforward application of the “collective knowledge” 
doctrine, which imputes to an organization the collective knowledge of individual employees. See, e.g., 
id. (describing the relative ease of filing charges against SAC under the collective knowledge doctrine 
of corporate criminal liability). This indeed appears to be the DOJ’s theory, as the indictment focuses 
in significant part on the conduct of eight current or former employees—all of whom have been 
charged and convicted of insider trading. Nate Raymond, SAC Capital’s Martoma Found Guilty of 
Insider Trading, Reuters (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/us-sac-
martoma-idUSBREA131TL20140206 (observing that the conviction of former SAC Capital employee 
Mathew Martoma was the eighth conviction of a current or former SAC Capital employee). 
 280. Mark Gongloff, SAC Capital Indictment Does Not Mean the End of “Too Big to Jail”, 
Huffington Post (July 25, 2013, 6:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/25/sac-capital-
indictment-too-big-to-jail_n_3652646.html (noting that the government has taken an “unusually 
tough” stance against SAC). 
 281. See Rautenberg, supra note 279 (quoting Stanley A. Twardy Jr., who observed that “[t]he 
indictment of SAC is the first significant federal criminal prosecution of an American company since 
the Government charged Arthur Andersen, which caused the demise of Arthur Andersen”). 
282. Julie Creswell, A Relentless Prosecutor’s Crowning Case, N.Y. Times DealBook (July 25, 
2013, 8:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/a-relentless-prosecutors-crowning-case/ 
?ref=preetbharara&_r=0 (describing the SAC indictment as “a rare and bold step by the government”). Less 
than a month after the announcement of SAC Capital’s guilty plea, it was reported that JP Morgan 
was nearing a settlement with the Justice Department and various federal regulators for the bank’s 
alleged role in facilitating the massive Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard Madoff. Jessica Silver-
Greenberg & Ben Protess, Criminal Action is Expected for JP Morgan in Madoff Case, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 12, 2013, at A1. On January 7, 2014, the DOJ announced that it had entered into a DPA with JP 
Morgan pursuant to which the bank would consent to pay $1.7 billion in penalties. Press Release, U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, Manhattan U.S. Attorney and FBI Assistant Director-
in-Charge Announce Filing of Criminal Charges Against And Deferred Prosecution Agreement With JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., In Connection With Bernard L. Madoff’s Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme 
(Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/JPMCDPAPR.php. JP 
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At the same time, the decision to indict SAC Capital might not be 
seen as a dramatic shift from prior practice. Because the bulk of SAC 
Capital’s assets under management belonged to Steven Cohen, and 
because the firm had only about 1000 employees, SAC Capital’s demise 
did not appear to present the sort of collateral risk that prosecutors had 
historically sought to avoid.283 In fact, many commentators have 
questioned whether, after a lengthy investigation focusing on Steven 
Cohen’s role in a pervasive criminal scheme, putting the firm out of 
business was the DOJ’s precise objective.284  
When viewed in conjunction with the LIBOR cases, then, the 
Justice Department’s approach to SAC Capital could be viewed as a 
controlled exercise that continued to maintain a healthy degree of 
respect for the Andersen effect. 
3. Credit Suisse: The Beginning of the End of Modern DPAs?
To the extent that the LIBOR and SAC Capital cases raise any 
doubts about the DOJ’s abiding preoccupation with the Andersen effect, 
recent developments have put those doubts to rest. In both words and 
deeds, the DOJ appears to be undergoing a generational shift in 
mindset—one in which the threat of collateral consequences may be 
overstated.285 
 In March 2014, in remarks before a gathering of securities industry 
legal and compliance professionals, Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of New York, repudiated the notion of federal 
Morgan also agreed to pay an additional $1 billion to federal regulators for its alleged programmatic 
violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). Id. Notably, before determining to enter into a DPA 
with JP Morgan, the DOJ reportedly considered demanding that the bank plead guilty to a criminal 
violation of the BSA. Silver-Greenberg & Protess, supra, at A1. 
 283. See Morgenson, supra note 273 (“SAC’s $14 billion under management is not enough to pose 
a risk to the financial system.”); Gongloff, supra note 280 (“SAC Capital is hardly the test case for 
whether the government will indict a big, important financial firm.”). While opinions may differ as to 
whether SAC Capital case represented a permanent shift in the DOJ’s approach to corporate 
criminality, it is clear that the government did not entirely abandon its concern about the collateral 
consequences of such prosecutions. To ensure that SAC Capital would continue operating during the 
pendency of the proceedings against it, the DOJ agreed to the imposition of a protective order permitting 
SAC to continue to do business. Patricia Hurtado, SAC Judge Lets Firm Keep Operating While Facing 
Charges, Bloomberg Businessweek (Aug. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-08-09/sac-
allowed-by-judge-to-keep-operating-while-facing-charges-1. 
 284. By all indications, the Justice Department succeeded. On August 28, 2013, it was reported 
that SAC Capital lost its last outside investor. See Jenny Strasburg, SAC Loses One of Its Most Loyal 
Investors, Wall St. J. MoneyBeat (Aug. 28, 2013, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/08/ 
28/sac-loses-one-of-its-most-loyal-investors/tab/print. In March 2014, SAC Capital announced that it 
had changed its name to Point72 and would operate as a family office. SAC Capital, Meet Point72 
Asset Management, N.Y. Times DealBook (Apr. 7, 2014, 12:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2014/04/07/sac-capital-meet-point72-asset-management. 
 285. Kara Scannell, Shift in Tactics pays off for DOJ, Fin. Times, May 20, 2014, at 16 (noting that “Credit 
Suisse’s guilty plea reflects a dramatic evolution in thinking within the DOJ under [Eric] Holder”). 
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prosecutors maintaining a “too big to jail” charging policy in perhaps the 
most forceful terms to date. “No one,” he maintained, “should receive a 
get-out-of-jail-free card based on size.”286 In Bharara’s view, “after Arthur 
Andersen, the pendulum has swung too far and needs to swing back a 
bit.”287 Bharara went on to offer his own perspective on the issue of 
collateral consequences: 
Companies, especially financial institutions . . . have a natural and 
powerful incentive to make prosecutors believe that death or dire 
consequences await on the other side of such an action . . . . I have 
heard assertions made with great force and passion that if we take any 
criminal action, the skies will darken; the oceans will rise; the nuclear 
winter will be upon us; and the world as we know it will end . . . . What 
I have found typically is that, in reality, as we suspected, the sky does 
not fall . . . . And so, this repeated Chicken Little routine . . . begins to 
wear thin. And the result is that we view with more and more 
skepticism . . . all the breathless claims of catastrophic consequences 
made by companies large and small.288 
Having thus down played concerns regarding the Andersen effect, 
Bharara predicted that “before too long a significant financial institution 
will be charged with a felony or be made to plead guilty to a felony, 
where the conduct warrants it.”289 
 Less than two months later, on May 19, 2014, the Justice 
Department announced that Credit Suisse Group AG (“Credit Suisse”), 
the parent company of the Swiss-based global bank, pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to aid and assist U.S. taxpayers in filing false income tax 
returns with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).290 According to the 
plea agreement, Credit Suisse employed a variety of methods to assist 
U.S. clients in concealing their undeclared accounts, including: assisting 
clients in using sham entities as beneficial owners; destroying account 
 286. Press Speech, SIFMA’s Compliance and Legal Society Annual Seminar: Prepared Remarks 
of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara (Mar. 31, 2014), http/www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressspeeches/ 
2014/SIFMARemarks2014.php [hereinafter Bharara SIFMA Remarks]. 
287. See id. 
 288. See id. (“They predict that the stigma and reputational damage from any criminal action—even a 
deferred prosecution—will be too much to bear: the stock price will plummet; clients will vanish; customers 
will flee; key employees will quit; and senior executives will be so ashamed to be associated with a criminal 
resolution that they themselves may have to consider whether they can even stay on as leaders.”). 
289. Id. Bharara expressed the view that perhaps the “greatest existential threat” to a corporation 
came not from the prosecutor, but from “the regulator who has the power to revoke a charter.” Id. 
“[B]anking regulators with whom the revocation decision ultimately rests,” he observed, “are often loathe 
to commit to a decision before or even at the same time as the prosecutor.” Id. If the regulator does not 
rule out the possibility of a charter revocation, “then prosecutors must continue to consider that as a 
possibility.” Id. Because “not all corporate criminal misconduct is deserving of a death sentence,” 
moreover, “prosecutors cannot be as aggressive as perhaps they should be.” Id. Bharara opined that 
prosecutors and regulators should work in concert so as to avoid creating “a gaping liability loophole that 
blameworthy companies are only too willing to exploit.” Id. He noted that this dynamic was “changing for 
the better,” and predicted that there would be “proof of that in the future.” Id. 
290. See Credit Suisse Press Release, supra note 20. 
June 2014]  TOO BIG TO JAIL 1339 
records sent to the United States for client review; and structuring funds 
transfers to avoid transaction reporting requirements.291 Credit Suisse 
admitted to having operated an illegal cross-border banking business 
that assisted thousands of U.S. clients in opening and maintaining 
offshore bank accounts in a manner designed to conceal their assets and 
income from the IRS.292 Credit Suisse also agreed to pay approximately 
$2.6 billion in fines to the DOJ and other federal and state regulators.293  
 The importance of the Credit Suisse case cannot be overstated. It 
marks the first time a financial institution of this size has pleaded guilty 
to criminal charges since 1989.294 After more than a decade of heavy 
reliance on DPAs as the preferred approach to addressing corporate 
criminal conduct, the DOJ now appears ready to challenge the basic 
assumption underlying such reliance: that DPAs are an effective hedge 
against the collateral consequences of corporate prosecutions. The 
Credit Suisse case confirms that the Andersen effect, once of paramount 
concern, may be of dubious certainty and severity in the minds of federal 
prosecutors.  
The question then arises whether the Credit Suisse case marks the 
beginning of a new era of corporate charging practice, one in which the 
modern DPA assumes a less prominent role. 
V.  Conclusion: In Defense of Deferred Prosecutions, Subject to 
a New Standard of Judicial Review 
The collapse of Arthur Andersen prompted a wave of scrutiny of 
the Justice Department’s corporate charging approach, and the eventual 
adoption of deferred prosecutions as the preferred measure to address 
corporate misconduct.295 More than a decade later, the financial crisis of 
2008 and ensuing economic downturn have triggered a new wave of 
scrutiny, this time of the DOJ’s reliance on DPAs.296 The scrutiny reached 
its peak when the DOJ entered into a DPA with HSBC despite evidence 
of egregious misconduct on HSBC’s part, causing key legislators and other 
critics to question whether the DOJ has maintained a de facto “too big to 
jail” policy with respect to major financial institutions.297 Since May 2013, 




294. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty in Tex Evasion Case, 
N.Y. Times DealBook (May 19, 2014, 4:50 PM), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/ 
credit-suisse-set-to-plead-guilty-in-tax-evasion-case/?emc=edit_na_20140519&nlid=52411902. 
295. See supra notes 78–93 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra notes 94–125 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 196–201, 286–289 and accompanying text. 
298. See supra notes 196–201, 286–289 and accompanying text. 
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Supporters and detractors of the Justice Department alike would 
agree that the new wave of scrutiny has coincided with two interesting 
developments within the judicial and executive branches of the 
government. The first, as reflected in Judge Gleeson’s opinion in 
connection with the review of the HSBC DPA, is a willingness of at least 
one federal district court to assume a more central role in the review of 
deferred prosecutions.299 The second, as evidenced by the LIBOR, SAC 
Capital, and Credit Suisse cases, is an emerging willingness on the part of 
the DOJ to pursue criminal charges over DPAs against corporations, 
including financial institutions.300 Both can be considered to have a 
substantial impact on future DOJ charging practices.301 
A. In Defense of Deferred Prosecutions 
The Justice Department’s recent efforts to secure criminal convictions 
from high-profile corporate defendants is concerning.302 The potential for a 
large, viable firm to be annihilated by the filing of criminal charges should 
be avoided at all costs.303 Moreover, when the target of such charges is a 
major financial institution, the potential damage to the broader United 
States’—or even the global—economy counsels in favor of prosecutorial 
restraint.304 That no corporations have collapsed after entering into DPAs 
with the government since the Andersen case is a clear indication that 
the DOJ’s decade-long charging policy has been effective, and should not 
be disturbed. 
Despite the potential harm that a criminal conviction can visit on a 
corporation, there is a growing sentiment in the Justice Department that 
the risk of another Andersen-style collapse is illusory, and that historical 
concerns were overblown.305 U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara has been the 
299. See infra Part V.A. 
300. See infra Part V.B. 
301. See infra Part V.B. 
302. Commentators have criticized Congress for taking the same reactive approach when passing 
criminal justice legislation to respond to dramatic instances of white-collar criminality. For example, 
“[i]n the aftermath of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, Congress passed the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Likewise, following the Enron debacle, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress.” Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Crime and the 
Recession: Was the Chicken or Egg First?, 200 U. Chi. Legal F. 205, 213–14 (2010). According to 
Podgor, “[t]he reactive model typically used after a crisis provides immediacy to solving the problem, 
but it often does not educate for comprehensively solving future legal issues.” Id. at 216. 
 303. See, e.g., supra notes 79–93 and accompanying text (examining conditions that led to Arthur 
Andersen’s demise). 
 304. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 Geo. L.J. 193, 198 (2008) (describing systemic risk 
as the risk “that a trigger event, such as an economic shock or institutional failure, causes a chain of 
bad economic consequences—sometimes referred to as a domino effect”). 
 305. In a recent article, for example, Gabriel Markoff provided empirical evidence demonstrating 
that of the fifty-four public companies convicted from 2001 to 2010, only five “suffered fates that could 
reasonably be described as business failures.” Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the 
Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. Pa. J. 
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leading voice articulating this new view, diminishing the “breathless claims 
of catastrophic consequences made by companies large and small.”306 The 
DOJ’s willingness to abandon ten years of calamity-free experience to 
pursue criminal charges against a succession of high-profile corporate 
defendants suggests that more prosecutions of financial institutions may 
be on the horizon. Indeed, as of this writing media reports indicate that 
the DOJ is seeking to extract a guilty plea from the parent company of 
BNP Paribas, and a fine as high as $5 billion, to resolve an investigation 
into extensive scheme to violate government sanctions.307 
For the Justice Department, the solution is not to jettison DPAs in 
favor of ramped-up corporate prosecutions; DPAs have consistently 
proven to be an effective way to minimize the risk of the Andersen 
effect, while allowing the DOJ to achieve most of its desired remedies. 
The filing of criminal charges and a statement of facts permit the 
government to send a strong public message regarding the type of conduct 
that it will not tolerate.308 The large fines that typically accompany DPAs 
are an effective method for exacting punishment and making 
restitution.309 By mandating extensive reforms, monitoring ongoing 
performance, and threatening prosecution in the event of compliance 
deficiencies, DPAs modify future corporate behavior.310 
The lone concern regarding the use of DPAs in the corporate crime 
context is the unfettered discretion the Justice Department has enjoyed 
to negotiate their terms.311 The incentive to avoid criminal prosecution at 
Bus. L. 797, 823 (2013). Of these five failures, he noted, none “could reasonably be said to have 
suffered a business failure because of their convictions.” Id. From this, Markoff argues, “[t]here is no 
empirical evidence to support the existence of the Andersen Effect.” Id. at 830. The suggestion that 
Markoff’s empirical findings debunk the notion that indictment is tantamount to the corporate death 
penalty is off the mark. For one thing, only two of the fifty-four convictions Markoff cited were for 
offenses involving fraud. See id. at 821. In addition, not one involved a financial institution. See id. 
Markoff himself concedes that his study supports only the narrow conclusion that where an 
organizational defendant is prosecuted for a crime that does not involve its core business model, the 
risk of the Andersen effect is not as prevalent. See id. at 832–34. 
 306. See Bharara SIFMA Remarks, supra note 286; see also Michelle Jones, Preet Bharara at the 
DealBook Conference, ValueWalk (Nov. 12, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2013/11/ 
preet-bharara-at-the-dealbook-conference (quoting an interview in which Bharara stated that the 
collateral consequences argument is “overstate[d],” and that “accountability matters,“ even when a 
financial institution is involved). 
 307. Maya Nikolaeva & Matthias Blamont, BNP Paribas Warns U.S. Sanctions Fine Could Exceed 
Provision, Reuters (May 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/14/us-bnp-paribas-agm-
idUSBREA4D0HL20140514; Christopher Matthews, Noeme Bisserbe, & Andrew Grossman, Why 
U.S. Is Pushing for Guilty in BNP Sanctions Probe, Wall St. J. (May 9, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702303701304579551792387975638; Yalman Onaran & Greg Farrell, 
BNP Paribas Risks $5 Billion Fine, Customer Flight, Bloomberg (May 21, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-21/bnp-paribas-risks-5-billion-fine-customer-flight.html. 
308. See supra notes 139, 142 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra notes 140, 142 and accompanying text. 
310. See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text. 
311. See supra notes 127–136 and accompanying text. 
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all costs essentially vests all power in the hands of federal prosecutors, who 
have developed the practice of structuring arrangements that provide for a 
potentially excessive degree of intrusion into a corporation’s operations.312 
Absent some kind of check, therefore, the clear benefits of deferred 
prosecution can be eclipsed by the potential for prosecutorial excess.313 
B. A New Standard of Judicial Review of DPAs 
For the better part of the last decade, district judges have assumed a 
sidelines role in corporate criminal prosecutions.314 As Judge Gleeson 
observed, the Speedy Trial Act describes only the effect of a court’s 
approval of a DPA; it does not serve as a guide for judges’ exercise of 
their discretion.315 District judges generally appear on the scene only after 
the DPA is a fait accompli, and then provide automatic approval to terms 
dictated by the government. 
The new standard of judicial review of DPAs that Judge Gleeson 
proposed in the HSBC case is a welcome development. Judicial 
intervention can serve as a vital safeguard against prosecutorial abuse of 
the sort that has been associated with modern DPAs.316 It can also 
provide a measure of independent assurance that the terms of settlement 
are not unduly lenient. At a minimum, a more prominent judicial role 
may provide more legitimacy and transparency to the process. 
Judge Gleeson’s reference to a federal court’s supervisory power 
falls short of the optimal standard, however. Courts generally invoke 
their supervisory power only upon a defendant’s urging.317 In other 
words, it would be odd for a district judge to intervene on a corporate 
defendant’s behalf if the DPA reflects a bargained-for exchange, and 
does not, as Judge Gleeson described, “transgress[] the bounds of 
lawfulness or propriety.”318 
To fill the void, Congress should amend the Speedy Trial Act to 
provide a clear framework for judicial review and approval of DPAs. A 
promising starting point for this discussion is a proposal originally 
considered by Congress back in 2009. The Accountability in Deferred 
Prosecution Act (“ADPA”) was intended to “promote uniformity and to 
312. See supra notes 133–236 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Koehler, supra note 133, at 997 (finding that prosecutors occupy positions of “advocate, 
judge, and rulemaker,” and “induce settlement through the ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ they possess even 
though many of the enforcement theories leading to these resolutions are untested and dubious”). 
314. See Gillison, supra note 45. 
315. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 3306161, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 1, 2013). 
316. See supra Part II.A. 
 317. “In the typical supervisory power case, the defendant raises a purported impropriety in the 
federal criminal proceeding and seeks the court’s redress of that impropriety.” HSBC Bank USA, 
N.A., 2013 WL 3306161, at *6 (citation omitted). 
318. Id. 
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assist prosecutors and organizations as they negotiate and implement 
deferred prosecution agreements.”319 ADPA directed the Attorney 
General to “issue public written guidelines for deferred prosecution 
agreements and non-prosecution agreements.”320 ADPA also provided 
that approval of a DPA should issue only “if the court determines the 
agreement is consistent with the guidelines for such agreements and is in 
the interests of justice.”321 ADPA further ensured judicial review on the 
back end of the process, providing that “[t]he court shall, on motion of 
any party or the independent monitor if there is one, review the 
implementation or termination of the agreement, and take any 
appropriate action, to assure that the implementation or termination is 
consistent with the interests of justice.”322 
Congress would be well advised to complete the work it began in 
2009 by enacting the ADPA. To empower district judges to engage in a 
meaningful review of the terms of corporate DPAs, however, a 
revitalized version of the Act should also include a prescriptive roadmap 
for the inquiry a court must undertake to ascertain whether a proposed 
DPA is “in the interests of justice.”323 As a condition of granting approval 
of a DPA, the court should be required to consider, and render findings 
of fact with respect to whether the terms of the DPA are fair and 
reasonable in relation to the acknowledged corporate misconduct. To 
support this review, the court should specifically address the following 
issues: 
 319. H.R. 1947 § 4(a), 111th Cong. (2009). The ADPA was never voted out of committee, and 
therefore was never enacted. 
320. Id. § 7(a). 
321. Id. 
 322. Id. § 7(c). Recently, lawmakers in the United Kingdom introduced DPAs to their corporate 
crime enforcement regime via the Crime and Courts Bill, which received Royal Assent on April 25, 2013, 
and became the Crime and Courts Act 2013. See Crime and Courts Act, 2013, c. 22, sch. 1–25 (Eng.). The 
central contribution of the Crime and Courts Act is its introduction of DPAs to the UK. Id. § 1, sch. 17 
(defining DPA). In contrast to the use of deferred prosecution in the United States, the act authorizes 
prosecutors to enter into DPAs only with corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associations, 
not with individuals. Id. § 4(1)–(3). The Act provides that after prosecutors and the corporate entity 
begin their negotiations, but before the parties agree to the terms of the DPA, “the prosecutor must 
apply to the Crown Court for a declaration that entering into a DPA with [the corporate entity] is in 
the interests of justice, and the proposed terms of the DPA are fair, reasonable and proportionate.” Id. 
§ 7(1). Only upon the Crown Court’s declaration that the DPA meets both standards does the DPA
become effective. Id. § 8(3). Whether the Crown Court extends or withholds approval, it “must give 
reasons for its decision on whether or not to make a declaration.” Id. § 7(2). If the Court withholds its 
approval, it can do so in private. But if it approves the DPA “it must do so, and give its reasons, in 
open court.” Id. § 8(6). For a detailed discussion of the UK deferred prosecution process, see Speech, 
Oliver Heald, Solicitor Gen., The Mechanics of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the U.K. 
(June 26, 2013) (transcript published June 28, 2013), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
speeches/the-mechanics-of-deferred-prosecution-agreements-in-the-uk. 
323. H.R. 1947 § 7. 
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(1) Whether the admitted facts prove each element of the alleged 
criminal violation324; 
(2) The legal precedent supporting the DOJ’s interpretation of the 
relevant criminal statute; 
(3) Whether the corporate defendant has a history of similar 
misconduct; 
(4) Whether the individuals whose acts contributed to the alleged 
misconduct have been prosecuted for the wrongdoing attributed to the 
corporation; 
(5) Whether the proposed fine against the corporate defendant is 
sufficient to achieve the objectives of punishment and restitution; 
(6) Whether the governance measures the corporate defendant is 
required to undertake are the least intrusive to promote deterrence 
and rehabilitation; and 
(7) Whether the prosecutor and corporate defendant’s fear of 
collateral consequences is well-founded. 
A standard of review of this sort would ensure that judges are 
actively engaged in reviewing proposed deferred prosecutions. The 
requirement to delineate the Justice Department’s legal analysis and 
precedential foundation would therefore provide transparency regarding 
the DOJ’s interpretation of key provisions and would address concerns 
regarding potential prosecutorial overreaching. Examination of the 
corporate defendant’s admitted misconduct and any prior history of 
similar offenses, the extent to which individuals have been prosecuted, 
and the propriety of the proposed fine and governance measures would 
provide greater assurance that a DPA is not granted based exclusively on 
a perception that a corporate defendant is “too big to jail.” The process 
of rendering findings of fact with respect to all of these issues would 
provide a clear record confirming that the terms of the DPA were 
evaluated and deemed reasonable in light of all the relevant factors.325 
In short, the standard of review contemplated herein would capture 
the benefits of deferred prosecutions while avoiding the pitfalls that have 
accompanied their use historically. 
 324. See Pete J. Georgis, Settling with Your Hands Tied: Why Judicial Intervention Is Needed to Curb 
an Expanding Interpretation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 243, 277 
(2012) (arguing for a process of judicial review of DPAs and NPAs “in which a federal court should 
demand detailed information as to how the admitted facts violate the specific provisions of the [FCPA]”). 
 325. The benefits of this approach were astutely summarized by Judge Frank Easterbrook: 
“Explanation produces intellectual discipline; a judge who sets down in writing (or articulates in court) 
the methods pro and con, and his method of reaching a decision, must work through the factors before 
deciding, and we then may be sure that his decision is based on appropriate considerations even if not 
necessarily one we would have reached ourselves.” Horn v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 898 F.2d 589, 592 
(7th Cir. 1990). 
